The battles of Fallujah and Mosul – and the future or ISIL
Brian M Downing
I may be crazy, but it looks like the Japs have quit the war, at least in this sector.
– Message at outset of the battle of Okinawa
Delete all after ‘crazy’.
– Admiral Nimitz’s reply
Fallujah has seen a great deal of fighting. Insurgent guerrillas and al Qaeda fighters controlled it until an American operation cleared it. During the Sunni Awakening, tribal militias drove the last of al Qaeda from the city. ISIL seized Fallujah in early 2014 – before it took Mosul.
The Iraqi army in recent weeks placed the Mosul campaign on hold and concentrated on Fallujah. About 50 miles west of Baghdad, Fallujah was a staging ground for the bombing campaigns in Shia parts of the capital which contributed to public discontent with the government. Iraqi troops have retaken much of Fallujah. The fighting was much less intense than that for Ramadi a few months back. Pockets of resistance are still here ands there, but they are not as fiercely defended as with such pockets in Ramadi.
What if anything does this tell us about the ISIL War?
ISIL a spent force?
Perhaps Fallujah fell so easily because ISIL has been broken. It has been defeated in southern Kurdistan, Kobane, Sinjar, and Ramadi. ISIL troops have endured thousands of airstrikes, which they have no defense from. Casualties have been heavy. ISIL finances are in disarray. Revenue from oil has fallen along with slumping world prices, and also from greater interdiction along smuggling routes. Taxation in ravaged and depopulated lands has plummeted, too. ISIL cannot always pay its fighters.
We do not have reliable information on the insides of ISIL, but it is reasonable to at least suspect that morale is low and the troops are near to exhaustion and disintegration.
This may be wishful thinking based on analysis from outside ISIL, which for all its acumen, does not take into consideration the determination and cohesion of ISIL fighters ISIL troops have demonstrated remarkable unit cohesion and tactical skill. This is attributable to their Salafi faith which supersedes the tribal and ethnic antagonisms that weaken Arab armies. They are the best fighters the region has seen in centuries.
Outside analysts might have looked to Germany and Japan at the close of 1943 and concluded that collapse was near. It wasn’t. ISIL, regrettably, probably has much more fight left in it – perhaps more than the overused and depleted Iraqi special forces.
ISIL strategy
As the Iraqi army encircled Fallujah, ISIL fighters began to sneak out along with throngs of civilians. They did not surrender or flee in fear. It was a methodical exfiltration, abandoning an indefensible position and heading for a more promising place to carry on the war.
The fighters may seek to reach Mosul and prepare to defend it from an impending Arab-Kurdish attack. But Mosul is a hundred miles to the north, with most of the roads and town under at least a modicum of government control. They may instead form roving guerrilla bands, possibly with the help of underground networks, harassing government convoys and outposts, and limiting the reestablishment of Shia control over Anbar province.
Whatever forces ISIL has in Mosul are preparing for a major and perhaps decisive battle. They hope to inflict egregious losses on the limited number of Iraqi troops that will engage in combat. This may enable ISIL to destabilize the frail Baghdad government and regain the initiative.
After Fallujah
ISIL may be able to take something positive away from Fallujah, depending on the behavior of Shia troops. The city is Sunni and what remains of the population will be wary of the latest victors. Will they govern competently and fairly? Will they oppress the Sunnis as ISIL collaborators drive and perhaps even try to drive them out? Precedents in Tikrit and Ramadi suggest the latter is more likely.
If Baghdad troops and administrators rule harshly, word will spread and the brutality will be magnified in the retelling. ISIL may win more support from indigenous Sunnis, especially in Fortress Mosul.
Military and political realities may steer ISIL onto a new path. The vision of easy conquest and a new caliphate may be receding on the desert horizon. ISIL may adopt a short-term objective of solidifying control by strengthening support from angered locals. It will no longer be the apocalyptic army of myth. It will be the defender of the Sunni faithful. In doing so, it might also become stronger.
Copyright 2016 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.