Can the US and Russia cooperate in Syria?
Brian M Downing
Secretary of State Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov have met several times in recent weeks, giving rise to talk of the two powers cooperating in easing the war in Syria. Two issues are being discussed: cooperating in attacking ISIL and the al Nusrah Front (an al Qaeda affiliate), and isolating al Nusrah from the other rebel groups which ally with it.
Accomplishing these two tasks, it is hoped, will build trust that will help bring a settlement to the long war. But this is the Middle East. Nothing comes easily there. And the idea of trust between Washington and Moscow will strike many as implausible – not after the Ukraine. Nonetheless, the two powers are already cooperating on logistics and training in Afghanistan, and hard nosed realpolitik can prevail – even in the Middle East.
Limited American influence
The US is certainly capable of concentrating air assets on ISIL and AN. It has been pounding the former for well over a year and the latter intermittently for many months. Convincing other rebel groups to break from AN, however, will, prove difficult. Washington does not have great influence on the ground in Syria. Attempts to build forces have failed badly. There’s been recent success with a Kurdish-Arab group called the Syrian Democratic Forces, but they concentrate in the east on Raqqa and its intentions after taking the ISIL capital are unclear.
Most rebel forces are more closely tied to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Turkey – not the US. If Moscow and Washington think they can press those countries into a concerted effort, they will likely be keenly disappointed.
Rebel groups are amenable to opposing ISIL, but fighting AN is another matter. Many groups are of the same hardline Islamist mold as al Qaeda, and find AN a useful fighting partner, especially when government troops are driving on them. Further, Saudi Arabia and Qatar find AN a stalwart force and even claim (on little evidence) that they are moderating it. Israel, no friend to Islamism, finds AN useful when it is engaged with Iranian-backed Hisbollah troops, and has even supported it with airstrikes.
The drive on Raqqa
The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces are driving on the ISIL capital from the north, Russian-backed government troops are coming from the south. Cooperation between the two rival ground armies will be difficult and risky, as each covets the prestige conferred by hoisting its flag over the city center. Who will take it? Who must settle for the consolation prize of adjacent wasteland? Clashes are likely.
A comparison might be drawn with the drive for Berlin in 1945. Each side dutifully apprised the other of its precise positions and avoided inadvertent clashes. Further, it had already been decided that the Third Reich’s capital would be administered by all allied powers, hence actual seizure of the capital had less import. There are no such parallels in the fight for Raqqa.
A Shia rump state
Russia’s deployment of air support last year blunted rebel advances and impressed upon them that the Assad government would not fall. The partial withdrawal of aircraft signaled Assad that Russia was not going to help him reconquer all Syria. He would have to settle on a rump state in the west.
The US is resigned to a Shia rump state, though it unlikely to say so publicly. Whether Assad remains in power or is shuttled off to a dacha in the Crimea may be determined later. Allies and rebel chieftains too will have to accept the rump state. The US and Iran might find common ground here, unless the mullahs and generals are clinging to visions of full reconquest.
Who wants cooperation more?
Bringing even a partial settlement will increase Moscow’s influence in the region and somewhat rehabilitate the damage to its image by events in the Crimea and Ukraine.
Channeling rebel energies against ISIL and AN would transform the conflict into a war of attrition that wears down thousands of Chechens and Dagestanis serving them. Better they fight and die there than back in the Russian Caucasus.
The American public wants to see progress in the ISIL War and the easing of the civilians’ plight, though neither constitutes a driving force in national affairs. After repeated failure on the Palestinian issue, the outgoing president’s desire for a positive legacy in the Middle East might be more important.
Copyright 2016 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.