A Kurdish offensive against ISIL is underway around Sinjar. The Kurds have been the most effective fighters in the ISIL War, pushing the militants out of the north, including the approaches to Erbil. Syrian Kurds delivered a serious blow to ISIL at Kobane, forcing it to retreat from the city and rethink notions of invincibility.
The Kurdish campaign on Sinjar has a military dimension. The forces engaged in battle vary in quantity and quality. And as with most military campaigns, the campaign has a political dimension.
Why Sinjar?
The key ISIL position in Iraq is Mosul. It has held the city for almost a year and a half and built formidable defenses – mines, sniper positions, and concrete fortifications. ISIL has developed a measure of support from indigenous Sunnis who despise the Shia government and are increasingly hostile to the Kurds, who have driven Sunni Arabs from areas they retook from ISIL.
Taking Mosul would be a stinging defeat for ISIL, but it would be very costly. The Kurds might take catastrophic casualties and suffer infighting, setting back their agenda for a year or more. Further, they have little interest in a Sunni Arab city. Better to concentrate on ridding Kurdistan of ISIL and consolidating defenses of newly acquired territory and oil fields. Better to let former oppressors live under ISIL’s hard hand.
Sinjar lies astride a highway connecting Mosul to ISIL’s self-proclaimed capital of Raqaa in Syria. The city comprises Kurdish and also Yazidi peoples to whom the Kurdish government and forces have kinship. Beyond that, taking Sinjar will advance political goals.
The Kurds have met with more success than have the Iraqi army and Shia militias to the south. Baghdad’s armies have been far less spirited and have elicited scorn and derision from the world. In the battle of Sinjar the Kurds will try to underscore their image of effective if not heroic fighters and make the case to the world for its independence from Iraq.
Kurdish forces
Positioned near Sinjar are various Kurdish forces, from Kurdistan (Northern Iraq), Syria, Turkey, and a small number of Iranian Kurds who have crossed the frontier to fight with kin and hone their fighting skills for their insurgency against Tehran. Though precise numbers are elusive, the Kurds almost certainly hold a substantial numerical advantage over ISIL in and near Sinjar, which is not nearly as heavily defended as Mosul.
The presence of fighters from four countries with Kurdish populations does not mean unity of command. Leaders have conflicting loyalties, outlooks, and ambitions. They are unlikely to work together in planning, logistics, or operations. Nonetheless, Syrian forces to the west – Kurds and Arabs – may launch a drive for Raqaa which will limit ISIL’s ability to reinforce and resupply.
The US and other allies will provide air support. Indeed, they are almost certainly preparing for sortie after sortie in the hope of repeating the battle of Kobane, where ISIL suffered high casualties before having to retreat.
ISIL forces
ISIL has the best fighters in Syria and Iraq. Its fighters are inspired by fierce Salafi beliefs, trust in comrades and commanders, and the experience of victory. They have worked hard in fortifying Mosul but this will not affect the battle for Sinjar. ISIL has two options.
First, ISIL can reinforce its positions in Sinjar and seek to inflict a serious defeat on the motley Kurdish troops and reestablish its morale and momentum. This will require sending convoys from Mosul or Raqaa in Syria, or both, and sustaining operations for weeks or months.
ISIL has shown the ability to move troops despite drones and fighters overhead, usually in smaller numbers and disguised as civilian traffic. However, the battle itself will require troop concentrations – in defensive positions and preparing for attacks. Air power may prove devastating. Pilots are prepared.
Second, ISIL may opt not to contest Sinjar, seeing it as a trap and concentrating instead on strengthening control over Mosul – a prestigious and populous holding. ISIL has already shifted its propaganda from executions of prisoners to demonstrations of governing ability – schools, utilities, hospitals. ISIL may be rebranding itself, at least temporarily, from harbingers of a new caliphate to defenders of Sunni honor.
This second option risks severed communication between Mosul and the rest of ISIL, meaning little if any new supplies or recruits for the city. It will also underscore ISIL’s loss of momentum and threaten to reduce it, once Ramadi and other strongpoints are similarly encircled, to a confederation of beleaguered enclaves – no longer a feared movement holding large swathes of Mesopotamia.
©2015 Brian M Downing