Time to rethink US-Saudi ties (while we can)?
Brian M Downing
President Obama’s greeting on his arrival in Saudi Arabia was less than warm. He was met by a less than august figure in the Saudi state and given relatively little attention in local media. The Saudis, as the expression goes, were sending a message. They are upset with the US over its attempt to reopen relations with Iran and over US pressure on the Sunni monarchies to democratize.
US-Saudi relations have been important since Abdul Aziz ibn Saud met with Franklin Roosevelt at the close of World War Two. But that was long ago. How important are US-Saudi relations today? Who gets more out of the arrangements?
Oil
The US was an oil exporter until the 1950s when suburbs and automobile sales boomed. The US became dependent on imports from the Persian Gulf, so much so that by the early 70s, Saudi Arabia et al could send shock waves through the US by cutting back their exports.
US production has increased tremendously and the US will near self-sufficiency in twenty years. Saudi Arabia and its Sunni partners have allowed prices to slump badly, reducing US production.The US-Saudi relationship has shifted from dependence to antagonistic rivalry. Indeed, the Saudis could be said to be waging economic sabotage on the US oil industry, though it is bringing fiscal troubles on themselves which do not augur well for longterm stability.
Military matters
When the American president and the Saudi king met in 1945, the former led the most powerful country in the world, the latter led a frail country defended by motley tribal militias – colorful, evocative of past glories, but useless. Saudi Arabia was a helpless protectorate. Rising oil prices in the 1970s led to increased armed purchases from Gulf powers, especially Saudi Arabia, but little has changed. The US remains the guarantor of the Gulf monarchies.
The militaries of the region are not capable allies. They have only token presences in the ISIL War and have mis-prioritized their security interests in a sectarian squabble in Yemen. Their allies in that conflict, it must be noted, are often intertwined with al Qaeda and ISIL bands.
The US once had several military bases inside Saudi Arabia. But they were closed about fifteen years ago at the insistence of the House of Saud, which deemed them a source instability in the realm. This tells much of the populace’s opinion of the country that has defended them since 1945, especially after Iraq invaded Kuwait and threatened the Kingdom in 1991. The US is nonetheless able to maintain a strong presence in the Gulf with bases in the Emirates, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, and Qatar.
Saudi Arabia is the third largest purchaser of arms in the world. It buys weapons from many powerful states, though especially from the US. The chief intent here is not to build a formidable military. It is to gain influence in the capitals of arms producers so that they will defend a country so important to their GDP and balance of trade.
Wahhabism
The 18th-century reform creed became the ideological cornerstone of Saud rule. It is austere, oppressive of personal freedoms, and overtly hostile to modern life. Saudi schools, seminaries, and aid programs disseminate Wahhabism throughout the Muslim world in order to build popular support for the Kingdom and strengthen its standing in that world. Nowhere is this more the case than in Egypt and Pakistan.
Wahhabism has definite affinities with violent jihadism and it is no overstatement to say that it has evolved into the creed of al Qaeda, ISIL, the Taliban and kindred groups from West Africa to Southeast Asia. Foreign pressure to rein in the ideology has met with only limited response. The Saudis have closed or cut off funding to some militant schools, but a fuller reform of Wahhabism would almost certainly lead to a violent reaction inside the Kingdom.
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Saudi Arabia simply isn’t as important as it once was. It no longer supplies a great amount of oil to the US, and what does come is due to Saudi ownership of refineries and retail gas stations in the US, not from free trade.
The Kingdom does, however, purchase a great deal of weaponry from the US and its allies. While this is an important source of high-paying jobs, it comes at the risk of ensnarling the US in Saudi Arabia’s sectarian squabbles and limiting better relations with Iran. More importantly, it risks placing the US in the position of holding up a doddering monarchy that is becoming more and more unpopular along regional, tribal, sectarian, and generational lines with every passing year. And with every year, the Kingdom is becoming more of a net liability.
Copyright 2016 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.