Kurdistan after the liberation of Mosul
Brian M Downing
Iraqi troops will probably retake Mosul in coming weeks or months. The battle will be fierce, the casualties, both civilian and military, will be high. Afterwards, old political conflicts that were put aside after the 2014 ISIL offensive will reemerge and command attention.
Among those conflicts, and second only to the Shia-Sunni enmity, is the question of Kurdistan. The Kurds have enjoyed de facto autonomy since a US aircap prevented Saddam Hussein from sending his army into Kurdistan after Gulf War One. The ISIL War has strengthened the Kurds’ hand, both inside Iraq and across the world. Independence, or something approximating it, is within reach. Everyone knows it.
The dispute
Kurdistan strengthened its autonomy after Saddam’s fall in 2003. It developed its own flag, constitution, and army. Baghdad’s troops are not allowed to enter. More recently, the Kurds have built their own pipeline system which sends their oil north into Turkey, where it’s shipped to buyers around the world. The Kurds are independent of Baghdad’s pipelines and partnerships.
Baghdad has legal claim to the Kurdish region and to its oil. Courts in the US and other countries respect the claims and Kurdish oil has only a few reliable purchasers, including Israel, Hungary, and an unknown Asian country, likely either India or China.
The ISIL offensive has altered the dispute. Iraqi troops fled in disarray when ISIL troops swept into the north. Kurdish troops, the peshmerga, were initially driven back too, but soon recovered to drive the jihadis back. Indeed, peshmerga troops advanced outside Kurdistan and retook lands and oil fields that in past years Saddam had laid claim to – albeit dubiously.
Today, Kurdish troops hold positions north of Mosul where fleeing or exfiltrating ISIL troops will find neither sanctuary nor pity.
International support
Turkey has long supported Kurdistan. The Kurds ship their oil through Turkish pipelines and in return strategically employ Turkish engineering firms to build infrastructure. Turkey is wary of the presence of PKK fighters in Kurdistan and has intermittently bombed them there. Its troops have been inside Kurdistan for about two years. They train peshmerga, deliver artillery support in the siege of Mosul, and most importantly, deliver an unmistakable “hands off” signal to Baghdad.
Israel, too, is a staunch backer of Kurdistan. Peshmerga fighters harried Saddam’s army, distracting him from looking to his west. More recently, Kurdistan has been a hub for clandestine operations in Iran. Israel wants a powerful ally against both Iran and the Sunni powers.
Western countries feel a measure of regret that duplicitous intrigue after World War One deprived the Kurds of their right to self-determination. Over the last two years the West has seen the Kurds play a formidable role in grinding down ISIL. Arab troops showed their heels, the Kurds their fighting spirit.
A fait accompli?
The Baghdad army, even if victorious at Mosul without serious losses, cannot subjugate Kurdistan. Its troops are not effective enough, the Kurds will wear them down until they and their government break, and the Turks are at the ready to help. Further, Baghdad would be inviting insurrection among Sunni tribes in western provinces – a movement the Kurds and Turkey would be willing to support, if only to achieve their aims.
Better for Baghdad to accede to the Kurds’ aspirations. Whether it’s called full autonomy or independence or a special status, something near full independence is preferable to a long war, alienation of the West, and further disintegration.
The Kurds will also benefit from an amicable settlement. Their border to the south and west will be secure, and they will have an alternate export route that will make them less dependent on Turkey, offering greater strategic flexibility in coming years.
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The American position is unclear. The US has built up Kurdish military power and resolve. Officially, however, Washington wants to keep Iraq a unified country. Paradoxically, it was the American invasion that set the stage for Kurdish independence and Sunni insurgency.
Copyright 2016 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.