Brian M Downing
Syrian Kurds have played a critical role in the ISIL War. They handed ISIL its first defeat at Kobane, where the seemingly invincible band was driven back from the Turkish border with heavy losses. Today Kurdish troops serve in the composite Syrian Democratic Forces which are about to attack ISIL’s Syrian capital, Raqqa.
Many publics, including western ones, have come to admire the Syrian Kurds. Their extension of citizen rights to women, who have hefted Kalashnikovs and served alongside men, has also brought respect. But geography does not favor them. The territories they dwell and fight in are landlocked and border mostly on unfriendly states. They do not have the oil wealth of Iraqi kin. Substantial help from the West will not be forthcoming. What options do Syrian Kurds have?
Common cause with Turkish Kurds
Syrian and Turkish Kurds may look upon Turkey as so beset by political polarization and army discontent that autonomy or even independence is within reach. They may opt to join forces, intensify the war with Ankara, and create their own country out of two failed states..
Such a war would be long, bloody, and probably inconclusive. Foreign help to the Kurds would not be strong. The US is indeed backing the Syrian Kurds but only in the ISIL War. Antagonizing a NATO ally, albeit a dubious and irksome one such as Turkey, will not find great support in Washington, not even in an administration with little regard for longstanding policies and principles.
Russia has historically been antagonistic toward Turkey. Only two years ago, Russian planes violated Turkish airspace and called on Ankara to stop oppressing the Kurds. Things change quickly in the region, though, and Moscow has since forged a partnership with Ankara based on fighting ISIL and weakening American influence.
Israel has long courted the Kurds as common enemies of Iran and Iraq, and further fragmenting Syria, an Iranian ally, is attractive. Full support, including sizable amounts of money and arms, isn’t very likely.
Alignment with Kurdistan
Syrian Kurds may look to their Iraqi kin. Kurdistan has its own army, constitution, flag, and pipeline system, and is all but independent of Baghdad. Kurdistan might welcome alignment with Syrian Kurds who though lacking in oil wealth, have demonstrated redoubtable fighting spirit. More fighters means more power.
The Kurds, however, are far from a homogenous people. They do not all speak the same language, literally or figuratively. Even in Kurdistan there are deep political divisions that could not be transcended even as ISIL drove into their territory. An attempt to integrate Syrian Kurds would not proceed smoothly. It might worsen existing tensions between Kurdistan’s feuding parties.
More importantly, Kurdistan is highly dependent on Turkey. Its oil flows north and reaches importing nations through the Turkish port of Ceyhan. Ankara is wary that cooperation among Kurdish regions will be a precursor to a war of independence in Turkey’s restive southeast.
Turkish protectorate
Turkey is presently establishing positions in northern Syria. Its army, in cooperation with Free Syrian Army units, has carved out territory and is forming administrative centers. A protectorate is coming into being, charged with limiting ISIL’s ability to strike inside Turkey and standing watch on Syrian Kurds.
Ankara may attempt to make Syrian Kurds as beholden to it as Kurdistan is today. Ankara can offer money and protection, perhaps with Russian guarantees, in exchange for detaching Syrian Kurds from those of Turkey. This move isn’t likely – not so much because of solidarity among Kurds, more because of profound mistrust between Syrian Kurds and Turks.
American protectorate
The US has cobbled together various Kurdish and Arab militias into the Syrian Democratic Forces. Well-equipped and determined, the SDF has a presence in northern Syria and is laying siege to Raqqa.
An enduring American-backed protectorate is not likely. American logistical support relies on the approval of Ankara and Baghdad, neither of which welcomes greater Kurdish power. Further, at least some American commitments are subject to reappraisal over the years, and a mercurial president with a limited understanding of foreign policy will not inspire trust.
Syrian protectorate
Though often considered one of the many groups opposed to the Assad government, Syrian Kurds have been more deeply engaged in fighting ISIL and other rebel groups. Early in the war, Damascus offered recognition of Kurdish rights in exchange for neutrality. It might be the best option, not only for the Kurds but also for Syria and Russia.
The Kurds will get autonomy and support in money and arms from both Syria and Russia. The Kurdish region will be a counterpoise to Turkey and its Free Syrian Army protectorate.
Damascus will have at least de iure claims on the region. While illusory, at least in the short run, it’s preferable to further disintegration of the Assad demesne. Settling with the Kurds will make Assad at least somewhat less reprehensible to the world.
The same can be said of his Russian ally in the pitiless reconquest of Aleppo. Russia will gain influence with Syrian Kurds – and perhaps one day with Kurdistan just to the east. Russian influence in the region will continue to increase at the expense of America’s. However, as with Russian efforts in Libya and Afghanistan, outmaneuvering the US in Syria may result in burdensome entanglements rather than strategic benefits.
Copyright 2017 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.