Brian M Downing
The Taliban, against even its own expectations, has overwhelmed the Kabul government and apparently the organized Tajik resistance too. They do not yet control the country and their ability to ever do so is doubtful. The Taliban’s success hinged not on popularity or military mastery but on its opponent’s incompetence.
Many northerners and most urban dwellers dread the prospect of another Taliban regime, though most have no memory of 1996-2001. Sixty-two percent of the population is under the age of twenty-five. They’ve not known Islamist austerity.
Demonstrations take place in many cities. Many have been dispersed by soldiers firing into the air. Others may be ended by more determined shooting. Discontent will continue and probably worsen. It will be based not only on oppressive rule but also on longstanding opposition to Pashtun governance and emerging opposition to Chinese ascendance.
Pashtun rule
Pashtun kings of centuries past may enjoy lingering mythic respect but their descendants are widely disliked. The non-Pashtun populace, some fifty-eight percent, is weary of their claims to be a majority and natural rulers. The present Taliban government is the fourth Pashtun regime in the last half century. Each has brought discontent and opposition.
The communist government of the seventies and eighties was run by Pashtun politicians, mainly from Kabul and its environs. The last batch embarked on sweeping reforms across the traditionalist and mainly rural country. Moscow advised against it but Kabul reminded them of the great things Stalin achieved in the thirties, then proceeded. That sparked rebellion, Soviet intervention, and continuous warfare up to the present.
The Taliban emerged out of a mujahideen band from the Pashtun south. They gradually took most of the country, including Kabul in ‘96. Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazara, and others held out in the north until the US intervened in 2001, and the rout was on.
The victorious northerners were poised to govern but a national convention placed Hamid Karzai, a Popolzai Pashtun, in the presidency. The outcome was determined behind the scenes by Pashtun politicians. Karzai diligently worked to place fellow Pashtuns in ministries, provincial governorships, and the military leadership. Tajik and Uzbek generals were relieved of divisional and corps command posts. Pashtun replacements were chosen for loyalty to Karzai rather than merit.
Ashraf Ghani, an Ahmadzai Pashtun, replaced Karzai in a contested election with Abdullah Abdullah. He is half Pashtun, half Tajik, though his career has been with Tajiks. Abdullah became nominal co-president. Last august, as army and state crumbled, Ghani fled the country. Instead of a power-sharing arrangement, the Taliban became the sole government. Even the Taliban was surprised by the collapse. A new Pashtun era has begun in the last fifty years.
China
Karzai and Ghani sold the rights to Afghanistan’s prodigious natural resources to China. Unburdened by anything like the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, China obtained raw materials for their industries and the Kabul rulers got generous checks for their accounts, wherever they might be. Overshadowed by war, China has built iron, copper, and rare earth mines as well as the oil and gas fields of Kunduz province. Extraction routes have been constructed running south into Pakistan, west into Iran, and north into Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. It’s like Africa in the 19th century but without the ivory.
The West’s footprint is gone. China’s engineers and workers and contractors will become more numerous and more visible. The Taliban may become as obliging toward Beijing as their venal predecessors. Afghans will note the lingering burdens of Karzai and Ghani’s years in government.
Next: Resentment based on Pashtun misrule is strong among most Afghans. Resentment toward Chinese prominence is beginning. Both will energize opposition groups in coming years.
© 2021 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.