The Syrian civil war, despite movement of the lines here and there, has been stalemated for well over a year. The ongoing Russian-Iranian offensive may retake Aleppo and Idlib, though without having the momentum or numbers to defeat the rebels. World leaders are looking for a solution but trust is low and sectarian hatred high.
Russian president Putin and Israeli prime minister Netanyahu have reached undisclosed understandings about operations in Syria, more than apprising one another of air operations. As a confident of PM Netanyahu notes, “A Russian partnership with Iran and Hezbollah to save Assad is not necessarily bad for us.” (Jerusalem Post, 23 Oct 2015) Russia and Israel have the interests and capacities for a strategy that, while not bringing peace, may bring a measure of stability to western and southern Syria and alter the conflict in a manner conducive to serious international talks.
Russia and Israel?
The two seem unlikely partners. After all, anti-semitism pervades Russian culture and gave rise to murderous pogroms and Zionist conspiracy tracts. Jews have fled Russia by the thousands over the last forty years, many going to Israel. Nonetheless, many Russian Israelis retain affection for their former country. They acknowledge that the Red Army played the largest role in defeating the Third Reich, and liberated Treblinka and Auschwitz.
Commerce has strengthened the relationship. Russian oil flows into Israeli terminals, and Russia buys Israeli military equipment. Russia directs Israeli-made drones over Syria today. Russia, Israel, and Syria share grave concerns over Sunni militancy. Russia has the Chechens, Israel the radical Palestinian groups, and Syria the Islamist rebel groups. Little overt cooperation, in any event, is essential.
Russian interests
Russia has much to gain from efforts in Syria. They demonstrate firm commitment to an ally – this after Russia had to sit by as NATO pummeled Serbia then Libya. Russia is intent on retaining its naval base at Tartus (its only Mediterranean port) and expanding its presence with the Latakia airbase.
Helping with a settlement in Syria may help Russia’s image in the world which has been more than sullied by military actions in the Ukraine and Syria as well as the attendant deceptions. Putin will never be on the shortlist for a Nobel Prize, but he may win points for a bona fide effort to stabilize Syria.
Israeli interests
Like all countries, Israel wants friendly neighbors. That, however, isn’t in the cards, and so it prefers weak neighbors. Recent events have brought a strategic windfall. Iraq and Libya have disintegrated, Egypt is losing its grip on tribal areas to its east and west, insurgencies simmer in Iran, and a friendly Kurdistan is being born.
Israel wants Syria to go the way of Iraq and Libya and disintegrate into sectarian and tribal statelets. The civil war has already created that; a well-crafted policy today can ensure that its northeastern enemy remains fragmented and unable to pose a serious threat.
Israel too would value a breakthrough on the diplomatic front to counter world opinion focused on the Likud’s settlement policies and intransigence on the Palestinian question.
Strategy: Shia Syria, Sunni Syria
Russia may solidify the boundaries of a Shia-Alawi region stretching from Damascus to the Mediterranean coast. Israeli support will be tacit, though it may provide intelligence to expel rebel forces from Shia Syria.
This truncated Syria, shorn of its Sunni population, will be unable to pose a serious threat to Israel. Its army will be small and preoccupied with Sunni Syria. Russia, in any case, will press upon Shia Syria to respect Israel.
Russia will also press Iran to rein in Hisbollah, the Lebanese-Shia movement whose militia – trained and advised by the IRGC – expelled the IDF from Lebanon, intermittently harasses Galilee, and fights alongside the Syrian army. Israel, in return, will respect the delicate balance among Lebanese Shias, Sunnis, and Christians. No easy task on either count,
Shia Syria will constitute a buffer between Israel and militant groups in Sunni Syria, ISILstan, and Iraq. The region just east of the Golan Heights will be either part of Shia Syria or a Druze autonomous region. Israeli efforts to encourage the Druze, a people with its own religion and outlooks, to break from Damascus and become a protectorate, have not met with success.
After concluding the ongoing offensive for Aleppo and Idlib, Russia may call for a ceasefire in place and negotiations. The rebels’ foreign backers may force acceptance. Alternately, perhaps more likely, rebel infighting across Sunni Syria could become more internecine, as attacks on Russian and Iranian forces will be too costly, and as boundaries between Sunni bands are fluid and bitterly contested.
Some rebel forces will devote resources to administering their holdings in Sunni Syria, coalescing the lands into statelets backed by rivalrous foreign powers. The region’s disintegration will continue.
Problems
No course of action in the Middle East is without hazards and objections. Iran will want a land corridor from Tehran to the Mediterranean. That route, however, may be lost to ISILstan and other Sunni forces for years to come.
Iran and Israel will cringe at aligning on Syria, but it will not entail overt cooperation, and it might offer strategic options in a volatile region.
The statelets of eastern Syria may, after protracted war with each other, be vulnerable to reconquest by Damascus. Foreign backers will never cease backing Sunni statelets against a Shia resurgence, leaving the region akin to Europe after the fall of Rome – a patchwork of mistrustful duchies, fiefs, and bishoprics. Russia will have a presence in the region and Israel will have a buffer state.
©2015 Brian M Downing