After the Soleimani crisis

Brian M Downing

Tensions, sometimes very ominous ones, come and go in the Middle East. Since the killing of General Soleimani and Iran’s subsequent missile strike in Iraq, tensions have eased, at least for now. Iran’s response was fiery missile launches into dark skies and claims of high American casualties. Both were intended to placate the angry public.

The missile strike was quickly followed by conciliatory words from Iran’s foreign minister. He referred to the missile attack as a “proportionate measure”, indicating that in his government’s estimation, the IRGC general had been avenged and that unless further American actions came, the incident was over. The following morning an uncomfortable President Trump, after stating that Iran had “stood down”, offered no sign of further actions.  

Around the world

Actors in the Soleimani crisis are being assessed around the world. Much of the world, including many US allies, are ill at ease with Trump. They see him as undisciplined, erratic, egomaniacal, and reckless. He has shown little regard for allies’ concerns and is oddly defensive of Russia. The present crisis, they believe, is based on dubious assertions on Iran’s nuclear program.

US allies are not fond of Iran but do not see the point of unnecessary conflict with it. They prefer to trade with a country of 75 million people, many of them middle class with western tastes. 

The modest Iranian response to Soleimani’s assassination and the foreign minister’s carefully-crafted words were probably greeted with welcome and relief around the world. Iran managed to come across as the more adroit actor on the stage. And there is more distance between Washington and key allies.

Inside the IRGC

A few days after Iran’s response, the IRGC issued a statement that does not sit well with their foreign minister’s suggestion that the Soleimani incident is closed. A general said the response was “the starting point of a great operation” that would spread across the region. This indicates conflict between the IRGC on the one hand and religious and elected officials on the other.

The IRGC may see the missile strike as paltry in comparison to the assassination of its renowned general and the foreign minister’s words as displaying a lack of will and inviting further US probes. Large portions of the public, especially in rural villages and working-class districts, probably feel the same way. There may be more attacks by Iran-backed militias in Iraq and Syria, by IRGC naval vessels in and around the Strait of Hormuz, and perhaps by guerrilla forces against US positions in western Afghanistan. The generals will strengthen their popular base.

The view here has been that the IRGC wants to weaken religious and elected officials and dominant government. Religious figures, in the generals’ estimation, are riven by factions, including an appreciable one that calls for liberalization. Democratic voices are in cahoots with foreign powers and democratic government is slow and indecisive. An endangered nation must avoid that.

Russia and China would probably prefer a more resolute form of government in an important ally. Religious figures serve their countries better as legitimizing figures than governing authorities. And both Moscow and Beijing see democracy as a form of government that keeps rivals weak. 

© 2020 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.