Brian M Downing
The 2003 invasion of Iraq, we are told, was done to ensure Saddam Hussein didn’t have WMDs. However, days before the shooting started, the Bush administration framed the war as an effort to bring democracy to Iraq. That was an interesting shift in rhetoric from hard-nosed security to noble idealism – one that raised more than a little suspicion.
Today we know Iraq had no WMD program at the time and the intelligence the war was based on had been cherrypicked by the administration. Nonetheless, there is now a kernel of democracy in Baghdad. Can it work there?
Sectarian conflict
Elections in the 60%-Shia country brought that branch of Islam to dominance. The Shia had developed clandestine but well-known ties to Iran in previous decades, so Saddam’s hostility toward Tehran dissolved with his regime. The Neoconservatives were appalled, even though they’d ousted Saddam and ushered in majority power. Shia governments, however, have steered a neutral course between Iran and the US. Neoconservative complaints of Iranian influence persist but are overstated and deliberately so in order to strengthen present plans for the Middle East.
Iraqi politics is rent by sectarian animosities. The Shia see themselves as pious survivors of Sunni oppression, which killed hundreds of thousands, most recently in massacres after Gulf War One (1991). Sunnis look back on the last century and see a progressive nation directed by natural leaders of the army, state, and enterprise. The arrangement, in their estimation, was unjustly turned upside down by nefarious outside forces, leading to chaotic rule by apostates in league with “Persia”.
Bitter sectarian fighting and insurgencies followed the end of Saddam’s rule. The Sunni minority (18% of pre-war Iraq) became all the smaller through casualties and emigration. Fighting has declined precipitously but mistrust and antagonism persist. Conciliatory measures have not and likely never will bring harmony, at least not for decades. Worsening sectarian conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran will maintain and probably deepen parallel conflicts in Iraq. A renewed civil war isn’t impossible.
Ethnic conflict
Only a year ago, the Kurds of northern Iraq neared full independence. Kurdistan had its own army, flag, and government. As Arabs fought each other pitilessly in a disintegrating Iraq, the Kurds sent their oil through Turkey to world markets and bought arms. Fearing separatism in its own Kurdish region, Ankara cooperated with Baghdad and Tehran to thwart Kurdish independence – one of several betrayals of Kurdish aspirations since Versailles.
Forcibly reattached to Iraq, Kurdistan will only grudgingly take part in national life, save for sharing in oil revenues. The Kurds in coming years will try to mend their political and tribal divisions and await a new opportunity for independence. The Saudi-Iran conflict and the Kurdish-Arab region in eastern Syria (an apparent US protectorate) may provide that opportunity. But at present, the Kurds, like the Sunni Arabs, want a way out of Baghdad’s control.
Factionalism, Demography, and Corruption
Authoritarian rulers sometimes allow meek political parties. While they have little power, parties form links to civil society and learn to build coalitions which are helpful in transitions to democracy. Saddam allowed none of that and when democratic processes came, the country saw the sudden rise of over a hundred political parties with little experience in striking bargains or building coalitions.
Even within the Shia majority, coalitions are hard to come by. Governments take months to form and often require considerable pressure from Tehran and Washington. Parliamentary debates are spirited. Where Roberts fails, the Marquess of Queensberry offers hope. Perhaps the Neoconservatives foresaw a tumultuous country after Saddam – and a weak one that no longer posed a military threat.
Demography does not favor Iraq (or many other countries hoping to democratize). Fifty-eight percent of the population is under twenty-five and few see promising futures. Unemployment is high and blame readily and rightly attaches to politicians. They bear the brunt of criticisms over unequal distribution of oil wealth, routine terrorism, military incompetence, and utility failures. After all, their appointees, colleagues, and relatives run the oil industry, security forces, and public services. It would not be without precedent for a disaffected public to support a strongman who promises all good things, including a return to a mythic past.
© 2018 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.