China watches the war in the Ukraine

Brian M Downing  

China and Russia put aside centuries of conflict and forged an alliance to weaken US global power. Each power has pricked US positions along the Eurasian land mass, looking for weaknesses in Washington and its allies. China is an economic power with a growing navy. Russia has a large military, geographic expanse, and natural resources.

Xi sees himself as the more powerful figure and is dismayed by his junior partner in Moscow. Putin’s judgment on the Ukraine is questionable if not abysmal and his position might not be very solid in a year or so. Without a strong authoritarian Russia, China’s Long March will slow.

The Ukraine enterprise 

The invasion of the Ukraine has just begun but it seems to be poorly planned and executed. That’s clear in the Ukraine and the West – and in China as well.

Supply lines are dangerously packed. Spearhead units lack fuel. Air defenses cannot protect against drone strikes. Armor vehicles are being decimated by Javelins and NLAWs. A puzzling number of tanks and BMPs have been abandoned, either because of low fuel, poor understanding of location, or desertion.

If the war continues for six months or more, as it almost certainly will, the army will face serious manpower and morale problems. Many units will become ineffectual. Malaise could linger for years. Paradoxically, conquest of the Ukraine would bring disaster. Occupation would require several hundred thousand troops to handle insurgents. The will to fight back is clearly there and Western states will send in supplies by land and sea. A large portion of the army would be tied down for years and unavailable for other missions around Eurasia.

Russia is being hit by serious sanctions. Its economy will suffer and China may have to reach into its pockets. Though that will bring more power to Beijing and present still more influence in Central Asia, it wants a strong partner, not a bungler with outstretched hands. Xi is eager to mediate between Moscow and Kiev.

Xi and Putin

Putin’s judgment in the present war and his highly personal autocracy present problems for China’s plans.

Going outside the east where ethnic Russians reside was a tremendous miscalculation. That was clear to any analyst – in Russia, the US, or China. The campaign has breathed new life into NATO, strengthened respect for democracy, and presented Russian allies in a dark light. China, Inc has been embarrassed by a junior partner.  

Xi wants a strong junior partner in Moscow. Even prior to the Ukraine war Putin posed longterm problems. His power is highly personal, as with Stalin and Romanov predecessors, setting the stage for erratic despotism and succession troubles. China has party machinery to determine its next leader. Russia has nothing but Putin’s will. The prospects for civil unrest is clear and that endangers the Sino-Russian alignment and the Long March.

China, Inc

Russia’s military will be preoccupied for years to come and may be gravely worn down. Protests are become more numerous and continued casualties may worsen them. Representative government in Russia is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future but even a Russian rapprochement with the West – perhaps to end sanctions, attract investment money, or triangulate against China – would be disastrous. 

Without supportive authoritarian rule in Moscow, access to Central Asian resources would be endangered and reliable military assets would be reduced. China could be a strong regional power, but not the new global hegemon. What is to be done?

A chastened or even a new partner in Moscow may be needed. Xi may collaborate with Russian generals and oligarchs to find ways to control Putin, rein in arbitrariness, convince him to govern in a stable, collegial way, and liquidate the Ukrainian enterprise. Failing that, Xi et al can take firmer action. 

 ©2022 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.