Democracy and geopolitics in Iraq

Brian M Downing 

A second Arab Awakening is underway. Mass protests have continued in Algeria and the Sudan. The protesters are numerous and determined – even in the face of harsh repression that’s killed hundreds. The Hong Kong opposition to Beijing’s hovering fist is another case in point outside the Middle East.

Events in the Middle East seldom play out without foreign interference. American policymakers over the years have, for one reason or another, and usually only intermittently, supported democracy. Regional actors, especially Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies, see democracy as a threat to the monarchal rule and want to see it die. 

Prospects for a democratic Iraq

The Iraqi protesters who decry the corruption and incompetence of their politicians are part of an immense demographic bulge. Fifty-eight percent of the population is under the age of twenty-four. Few see opportunity for career, marriage, or voice in their future.

Saddam’s ouster in 2003 provided an opportunity for democracy. But with it came the sudden emergence of scores of political parties, not the handful who give structure to European and North American polities. Democracy can handle only so much diversity.

Iraq comprises three distinct and antagonistic groups – Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, and Kurds. Antagonisms have often erupted into sectarian murderousness, insurgency, and at least some support for al Qaeda and ISIL. 

Democracy would fare better in a loose federal system. American efforts might do well to ponder this. 

Iran

Iraq is surrounded by authoritarian states, Sunni and Shia alike, save for its western border with Jordan where representative government has a foothold. A thriving democracy in Iraq would encourage reformists throughout the Middle East. Rulers, then, want it to fail – or at least become aligned with them.

Iran has used its influence with Shia parties, some of which were established with Tehran’s help during the Iran-Iraq War of the eighties. It prevailed on bickering Shia parties to form coalitions which brought a measure of stability until recently. However, the war may have caused Iran to support Shia revanchism rather than reconciliation.

Saudi Arabia

The ambitious, ruthless, and inexperienced crown prince, is looking upon Iraq’s turmoil as an opportunity to expand his influence and weaken Iran’s. The kingdom has failed in its efforts to oust the pro-Iran Syrian government and Houthis in Yemen. The prince’s judgment is now debated within the royal family and his succession to the throne could be challenged. Success in Iraq would solidify his position.

The Saudis may seek to strengthen their ties with Iraq’s disgruntled Sunnis, some 20% of the population. This could take the form of strengthening its power within existing political arrangements, encouraging devolving power to a Sunni autonomous region, or even adjoining it with the Sunni region of Syria which the US, Britain, and France have established.  

Paradoxically, the Saudis have been able to establish ties with Moqtada al Sadr, the leader of a powerful Shia movement. Sadr parleyed with the crown prince earlier this year. Shortly later, his militias torched the Iranian consulate in Basra. Two powerful blocs, one Sunni and Shia, may give Riyadh considerable say.

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The Iraqi polity is fragile and under increasing strain. Should it break down altogether, as in Libya and elsewhere, ISIL and al Qaeda will be appreciative. Those groups have lost the swathes of land they conquered in recent years and are biding their time in underground networks.

Tehran and Riyadh must act carefully. If the Baghdad government were to crumble, AQ and ISIL would be able to reconstitute themselves along the Saudi and Iranian borders.

© 2019 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.