Embassy and endgame in Kabul 

Brian M Downing 

The Taliban appear unstoppable and Kabul is in trouble. Districts are falling one after the other and the army may disintegrate into ethnic militias, warlord bands, and roving bands. Kabul will face siege in a few months. That raises worries about the US embassy. It became immense as it oversaw program after program and tried strategy after strategy over the last twenty years. 

Washington intends to keep a sizable embassy staff and security contingent in-country, even after the September 11 target date. The embassy will soon face bombings and rocket fire, and an all-out attack looms.

The dilemma is clear. If the US closes its embassy and heads for the Khyber Pass (if it can), the Afghan army and state would collapse, leaving Afghanistan in greater chaos and the US in deeper tumult. Keeping a sizable contingent risks exposure to siege, hostage-taking, and massacre. 

The end is coming and Washington will shape it only in part. Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran will play more prominent roles. Each has more influence in Afghanistan than the US does and each is eager to weaken the US. Planners develop worst-case scenarios. Sometimes they’re useful.

Geopolitical context

The endgame is taking place as China seeks to assume status of the most powerful country on the stage, economically and politically. Beijing is using its new wealth to gain power in world organizations, build infrastructure leading to its industrial core, bring nations under its sway, and build an intimidating military. 

Russia is an important ally against the US. Moscow wants to restore Soviet-era power prestige and weaken the US and NATO, which advanced to Russia’s borders after the Soviet Union imploded. Moscow has been striking through cyberspace, challenging US airspace, and spreading discordant information. 

Iran is probably the US’s fiercest enemy. It’s eager to avenge years of assassinations, bombings, and sanctions that the US and allies are responsible for. It wants the JCPOA reinstated and sanctions lifted but it also wants the US on its back foot. It has aligned with China and Russia to achieve a portentous geopolitical shift.

All three powers have interests in Afghanistan. Russia and Iran have been arming the Taliban for several years and have long-standing ties with northern peoples and their militias. China has for over a decade been developing the country’s natural resources and extraction routes. Every Afghan faction will have to contend with that economic reality.

A third embassy debacle?

The US suffered deep humiliation when it had to flee the Saigon embassy in 1975. The military was reviled at home and a period of pullback in world affairs set in. The takeover of the Tehran embassy four years later and protracted hostage situation was even more humiliating. It was followed by more forcefulness in the world. A third debacle is at hand, its consequences unclear.

When Saigon fell, the embassy staff was taken by helicopters to naval vessels in the South China Sea. Afghanistan is landlocked and surrounded by states of dubious reliability or overt hostility. There is no secure exit route. 

The most likely way is south into Pakistan, by aircraft or ground vehicles, and then to ships in the Arabian Sea. Pakistan is unreliable. It’s duplicitous toward the US, supportive of the Taliban, and increasingly close to China. The Pakistani generals may seek to enhance their prestige by siding completely with the rising power. China may be offering inducements.

An alternative is north into Turkmenistan, then west into the Black Sea and Mediterranean. Though generally non-aligned, Turkmenistan uses Russian pipelines for some of its oil and gas exports. The US navy would have to deploy into the Black Sea. Only a small number of ships would be allowed under the Montreux Convention of 1936 governing the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits, but Russian forces in the Crimea would create difficulties, as might Turkish authorities. 

Another option is shuttling US personnel southeast to airfields in India – the most reliable country in the region. That, however, would require violating Pakistani airspace and though the area is mountainous and inhospitable, the flights could be challenged and bring consequences. Recall that shortly after the US embassy in Iran was seized in 1979, the one in Pakistan was stormed.

West into Iran is not an option. This raises a point long held here that better relations with Tehran would provide reliable logistical routes for US operations in Afghanistan. They presently rely, warily, on Pakistan and Russia. 

If exit routes are closed down, the Kabul embassy might be seized by victorious, vengeful Taliban bands who obviously will show no respect for diplomatic norms. Embassy personnel could be hostages for an indefinite period, or massacred in the sort of grisly display the Taliban was known for when in power. 

China, Russia, and Iran are in position to choke off exit routes and make another embassy takeover likely – or demand extraordinary concessions for safe passage through their countries. Another embassy humiliation would aggravate division inside the US, weaken the Biden administration, and increase the prospects for the populist Right in coming elections. 

It would also have great symbolic importance. Though well short of the fall of Constantinople or a foreign fleet in Tokyo Bay, the end in Kabul could be unmistakable sign that America is in serious, irreversible decline. The world must now look to China –  and heed it. 

© 2021Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.