Escalation routes in the Turkish-Kurd war

Brian M Downing 

Turkish President Erdogan has attacked the Kurds in Syria. The US position is confused. President Trump, noting his opposition to US efforts in the region, pulled US troops from the Syria-Turkey border. Turkish troops attacked shortly later – accompanied by the Free Syrian Army which was once aligned with the US. Characteristically, Trump sent more troops into Saudi Arabia not long after that.

Erdogan thinks he can take over a strip of Syrian Kurdish land, populate it with beholden Arabs, and move on. He’s convinced he has sufficient leverage with both Moscow and Washington to limit their opposition. We shall see.

The Kurds are a resolute tribal people who have been battling Turks since the days of the Ottoman Empire. They will not relinquish their homes without a fight and they may find more stalwart help than the US. Syria and Russia see Turkey’s plan to build a protective zone as an invasion and annexation of Syrian territory. The Saudis want Syria to remain fragmented, but they consider Turkey a rival for control of the region and deem the Kurds of Syria and Iraq as potential allies. Fighting near the border may go on for years and become increasingly convoluted. Formidable dynamics involving American enemies and allies are at play and may force Trump to rethink his position once again.

Russia and Syria

Syrian Kurds never broke with Damascus. They fought against other rebel groups and ISIL and received support from Syria forces and Russian airpower. They wanted the Kurds on their side, or at least not fighting them.

The US pullback will force the Kurds to move closer to Assad. He may come to their aid with arms, money, and Syrian troops and Russian mercenaries. There will be a price. Damascus and Moscow will press the Kurds to order the US and other western forces out of Syria. The West, they will argue, is no longer willing to help them. Truer words may never have been uttered by either government.

By opposing Turkey in eastern Syria, Moscow will be damaging promising ties established with Ankara in recent years. Good relations with Turkey fit well with Moscow’s aims of increasing arms exports, weakening NATO and the US, and bolstering its own power in the world. Moscow isn’t eager to support the Kurds and lose sway with Ankara, but Syria is more important. It’s a longstanding ally and home to major Russian military bases in Tartus and Latakia – its center of operation in the Middle East.

The anti-Iran coalition

Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies backed the Sunni rebels against the Assad government. The long effort failed. Today they are using diplomacy and promises of generous reconstruction aid to detach Syria from Iran. They are unlikely to succeed here either as the Shia elite know it would be only a matter of time until they were pushed out.

Riyadh wants to see Syria on its side but failing that, Syria must be weak, fragmented, and a drain on Iranian coffers. A separate Kurdish and Sunni Arab region in the east will limit Syrian power and threaten lines of communication with Iran.

The Saudis are none too friendly toward Turkey which they see as a rival for regional influence. One of Ankara’s chief foreign policy instruments is the Muslim Brotherhood, the international movement with a presence throughout the Islamic world. The Saudis fear the Brotherhood for its opposition to monarchy and its popular support, in the region and especially inside the kingdom.

Riyadh, then, will want to support the Kurds and Sunni Arabs of eastern Syria to counter both Iran and Turkey. Support may come in the form of money and arms to enable the Kurds and Arabs to wear down the Turks and prevent them from settling the border strip.

More importantly, the Saudis will push the US to continue or even bolster its presence south of the border region it withdrew from last week and aid the Kurds and Arabs, if only clandestinely.

Ultimately, Riyadh wants to establish a Sunni region saddling eastern Syria and western Iraq that will  block lines of communication between Iran and its allies in Syria and Lebanon – what has been called here “Sunnistan”.

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Syrian-Russian efforts in eastern Syria and Saudi pressure may force Trump to stay put. The American public may be distracted from domestic issues and call for deepening involvement. The Kurds are seen as stalwart allies in the ISIL war and worthy of our lasting support. Partisan opposition to the president favors the Kurds. More cautious voices on both sides of the aisle will ask if this means a permanent presence in a landlocked region.

© 2019 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.