Islamist militancy in the ‘Stans

Brian M Downing

Something’s developing in Central Asia.  There, amid expansive steppes and imposing mountains, numerous militant Islamist groups are planning, training, and coalescing.  They are thriving amid the three great powers they oppose and plan to fight – the US, Russia, and China.

The region has been Islamic for centuries, but in the last quarter century militant Islamism has developed there from three wellsprings.  First, the mujahideen who defeated the Soviet Union in Afghanistan set the example of Muslims defeating a Western power, something that history had not often offered in recent centuries.  Some of the USSR’s soldiers were from the Muslim republics of Turkestan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, and they returned to their homelands with stories of the fervent warriors in the Islamic war.  Second, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Muslims searched for a new identity and many found one in their long repressed faith.  Third, China’s heavy-handed rule over minorities on its periphery has caused dissent and rebellion.  The cause of Tibetans is well known; that of the Muslim Uighars in Xinjiang is not.  The Uighars have formed into a militant challenge to Beijing’s rule and have effected dozens of bombings in recent weeks.

The ideologies of the various groups range from self-determination to restoration of the caliphate.  Some positions resonate with longstanding western beliefs; others contradict violently with them.  Despite obvious disagreements between realists and utopians, between advocates of national sovereignty and of restoration of a golden age, the groups have working ties with one another.  Among them are the Islamist Movement of Uzbekistan (which despite its name operates in several countries and is now in northwestern Pakistan), the Taliban, Tehrik-e-Taliban (an Islamist group based in Waziristan), the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, Uighar separatist groups, and of course al Qaeda, which has ably reconstituted itself since being routed from Afghanistan in 2001.

They are funded by external Islamist groups and the opium trade, and manned by indigenous people and foreign volunteers.  Many of the groups enjoy safe havens along the Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier, almost certainly with support from parts of the Pakistani military.

In contrast, there is little cooperation among the US, Russia, and China to oppose the various Islamist groups.  The US, of course, is fighting several of these groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan; Russian troops fight in a few of their former Central Asian republics, and China seeks to crush the Uighars in its Xinjiang province.  Presumably intelligence is shared, and Russia and China have staged joint military exercises in the region.  But that’s about it – mistrust and lack of appreciation of the danger prevail.  And recent events in the Caucasus will only increase mistrust between the US and Russia.

Pointing to the danger of an Islamist base area is unfortunately reminiscent of the administration’s justification for fighting in Iraq because it would become an al Qaeda sanctuary.  Al Qaeda’s presence in Iraq was neither strong nor secure.  It comprised only about 1500 fighters and badly blundered by incurring the wrath of Iraqis, who are driving them out.  Perhaps it would be more accurate to say they are leaving Iraq for greater opportunities and supportive locals along the Pakistan-Afghan frontier.  And from there they collaborate with other groups in the region – amid the armies of the US, Russia, and China.

Copyright 2008 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.