Israel and Iran square off in Syria, as Russia takes notes
Brian M Downing
Israel and Iran once aligned against the Arab states. The partnership reaches back to Israel’s founding in 1948 and persisted even after the Khomeini Revolution in 1979. Geopolitics won out over ideology.
The two powers diverged in the 1990s as their common Arab foe, Saddam Hussein, was gravely weakened in Gulf War One and no longer constituted a unifying danger. As Hisbollah strengthened in Lebanon with Iranian support, common interests fell away.
Israel and Iran are now enemies. The former supports Kurdish insurgents in northwestern Iran, the latter supports Hamas in Gaza. Words fly, jets practice long-range strikes. They are faced off in Syria. Their enmity is an obstacle to peace. There is, however, potential cooperation in reducing the fighting. Oddly, Russia may be a broker here – a peace broker.
The Syrian war
Once the Camp David Accords (1979) brought peace between Egypt and Israel, Syria had no regional partner and could not fight Israel as in ’67 and ’73. There were skirmishes along the border, aerial engagements, and occasional airstrikes, but without Egypt, all-out warfare was unthinkable.
When the uprising against Assad began, Israel was uncertain how to react. Assad was a known opponent – a thoroughly intimidated one. A new government in Damascus, say, one led by the Muslim Brotherhood, was worrisome. The Brotherhood was ascendant in Egypt, Tunisia, Turkey, and elsewhere. Concerted action against Israel loomed.
The uprising turned into multi-sided warfare and Syria began to disintegrate. Israel opted to support, often with air power, whatever groups were fighting Iran-backed forces, especially Hisbollah. Israel also encouraged the Druze region adjacent to Israel to break from Damascus and become, in effect, a protectorate. Once Assad’s position stabilized, the Druze showed little interest.
Enter Iran
With its Syrian ally in danger, and Sunni monarchs eager to bring it down, Iran scrambled to prop up Assad. Money and arms flowed in, then Shia militias from Iraq and Afghanistan arrived. Last year 2,000 IRGC troops entered Syria and took part in a counteroffensive aided by Russian airpower. Results have been unimpressive.
The proximity of Shia militias and IRGC troops is naturally unwelcome in Israel, though not alarming. Any action toward Israel would lead to swift, devastating airstrikes. Iranian troops have no air cover of their own, Russia will not engage Israeli fighters, and the Syrian air force would be destroyed. Israel might welcome the opportunity to replay the 1982 “Bekka Valley Turkey Shoot” in which Syria lost over 80 aircraft, while Israel lost one.
Israel may want Iran and its allies stuck in a costly stalemate. IRGC casualties have already been surprisingly high, suggesting lackluster quality and rebel concentration on the IRGC. Iran can sustain the casualties; the costs, though, are burdensome amid low oil prices. With the Sunnis paying for the bulk of the war, Israeli costs are negligible.
Enter Russia
Peace in Syria is unlikely for years to come, but some parties can be pressed to reduce the fighting. Russia is uniquely positioned with both Iran and Syria, of course, but also with Israel, which trades with it and shares at least some interests in the volatile region. Russia can reduce, though not end, fighting in Syria, and perhaps reduce conflict between Israel and Iran as well.
First, Russia can press both Syria and Iran to abandon any hope of restoring Syria to prewar borders.They must accept a rump Shia state along the Mediterranean coast and stretching south to Damascus and the approaches to Golan. Putin signaled this recently when he withdrew a portion of his air force not long after Assad proclaimed a plan to reconquer all his domain.
Second, Russia can press Syria to refrain from skirmishes with Israel along the Golan Heights. Iran will be pressed to encourage Hisbollah to do the same along Lebanon’s border with Israel, and to limit arms sales to it.
Third, Israel, in turn, will accept a Shia rump state. Its resources greatly diminished, Shia Syria will be far less able to quarrel with Israel than ten years ago. Israel will also respect Hisbollah’s positions across the border, as long as the border is quiet.
Fourth, Israel, Russia, and even Syria will benefit from a Kurdish autonomous region along the Syrian-Turkish border. Israel wants a strong, friendly Kurdish region to oppose Arab power. Russia wants the same to worry its centuries-long foe, Turkey. And Syria will have at least a measure of influence in a region opposed to Sunni Arabs, especially Islamist ones.
This would be an impressive feat of Russian politics, as enmity is entrenched in Israeli and Iranian security bureaus. Russia’s prestige and influence would climb. Fighting in Syria would decline significantly. The rest of Syria, and much of western Iraq, would remain outside the influence of Russia, Israel, Shia Syria, and Iran. This area will be chaotic and engaged in extended, fruitless conflict – Hobbesistan.
Copyright 2016 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.