(More) mission creep in Iraq

(More) mission creep in Iraq

Brian M Downing

Late in Bush the Younger’s second term, Iraq ordered US troops to leave by the end of 2011, and the US complied. Iraq decided on US military trainers for its new army. So, some US troops in fact remained. Since then, al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) restored ties with indigenous Sunnis, strengthened immensely, and seized territory in Iraq and Syria. Now calling itself ISIL, its effectiveness – and the ineffectiveness of Baghdad’s forces – led to Baghdad’s bringing in US troops. More and more of them.

We now have “boots on the ground,” though the ambiguous slang phrase allows claims to the contrary. No one is insisting on a definition.

Gradual surge

ISIL moved into Syria as government troops withdrew. In June 2014, it swept into northern Iraq, seized Mosul, and threatened Baghdad. Alarmed, the US sent in reconnaissance drones and more trainers.

The US has since deployed special forces teams, additional trainers, and advisers at upper echelons. The US began an air campaign against ISIL troops positions, command centers, and economic assets. Largely unnoticed, the US recently deployed artillery units near Mosul. American advisers may soon operate near, or with, frontline troops to give tactical advice and to direct airstrikes.

US special forces teams are combat troops. So are artillery units. Pentagon doctrine defines artillery units, along with infantry and armor, as composing the three branches of the “combat arms.” The illusion and evasiveness in the phrase “boots on the ground” are fading.

ISIL danger?

ISIL has little if any offensive punch. After its startling offensive two years ago, it has suffered a string of defeats and lost considerable territory. ISIL took Ramadi last year but could not hold it. The large area still in its control is misleading as most of it is empty desert.

ISIL has a qualitative edge over regional adversaries. Its Salafist creed brings senses of community and mission that override the tribalism and parochialism that weaken other armies.

However, ISIL is badly outnumbered by Kurdish troops, Shia militias, and the Iraqi army. As Stalin is reputed to have said, quantity has a quality all its own. He should know. The immense Red army ground down the superior Wehrmacht, and took Berlin. Furthermore, ISIL has no defense against allied airstrikes.

US domestic politics

GOP presidential contenders call for a stronger effort against ISIL. Specifics aren’t forthcoming. One candidate called for carpet bombing ISIL positions, including the cities of Mosul and Raqqa. He either doesn’t know what carpet bombing is or he doesn’t know what a war crime is. Calls for ground troops are heard, too, and the idea is gaining momentum.

Polling data show frustration over the war’s slow progress, and support for (unspecified) greater action. However, a recent poll found that support for ground troops in Iraq is evenly split, with 49% supporting it, 49% opposing it.

Pressure to increase the US role is widespread but not especially strong. There is no meaningful opposition to it.

Iran

One reason for escalation is fear of greater Iranian influence – and greater Russian influence as well. Iranian advisers serve alongside Iraqi troops and Shia militias. Iranian aircraft deliver airstrikes. Iran has backed Iraqi Kurds since the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, and has delivered arms and advisers to Kurdistan. More recently, Iran has organized and armed Shia Kurds. They have skirmished with their Sunni kin.

The US and Iran are vying for influence in Iraq. The competition is of course refereed and exploited by Baghdad, which wants to avoid over-reliance on either power.

It bears noting that rising Iranian influence was not effected by Iranian force of arms or subterfuge. It came close behind the US’s ouster of the Sunni government and demobilization of its army.

Consequences of escalation

Greater US presence fits into Islamist ideology that sees the US intent on humiliating and occupying the region. Recruitment of new jihadis will increase, not only for war in Iraq but also for wars in Syria, Libya, Algeria, Morocco, Af-Pak, and volatile countries such as Tajikistan. Jihadi networks and lone wolves in Europe and N America will also be energized.

Apocalyptic thinking is spreading in the Islamic world. A final battle between good and evil is looming. There’s little doubt in most of the region which side the US represents.

Most Sunnis of Iraq’s Anbar province are sitting on the fence, unwilling to fight ISIL if it leads to reassertion of Shia control. They will look warily on a greater US presence.

Most Syrian rebel groups are hardline Islamists who seem moderate due to proximity to ISIL and AQ. They may turn on US-backed groups such as the Syrian Democratic Forces and at least ponder affinities with ISIL and AQ.

The US is deepening its involvement in the Sunni-Shia and Kurdish-Arab conflicts. The USA may be miring itself in Iraqi politics for years to come.

The Iraqi army, and other regional armies too, will be eager to see the US assume a larger ground role in the impending battle of Mosul. Indigenous forces will then have less incentive to professionalize and assume their proper role in the fight, preferring instead to remain unprofessional, corrupt, inept, and relatively safe.

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.