Negotiation and conflict in Afghanistan

Brian M Downing

The Taliban and American forces are reducing operations, preparing for more serious negotiations. Warfare has been continuous since 1979 and peace has been elusive. Even before the US helped expel the Taliban in 2002, the Taliban was fighting the Northern Alliance and a handful of insurgencies.

All factions are war-weary. Regional powers want peace along their frontiers and China wants stability to better develop Afghanistan’s natural resources. President Trump says he wants out. Nonetheless, an enduring peace will be difficult. 

Political economy and equilibrium

Details of a peace agreement can be surmised from what arrangements worked in previous decades. Both Britain and Russia found that Afghanistan was most peaceful, and their influence highest, when they disbursed money to judiciously restrained rulers in Kabul. The rulers then doled out the money to various tribes and peoples – but did not build up administrative bureaus in the localities. Kabul was agreeably generous and distant. The arrangement established a golden mean between a powerful state that would anger local sensibilities and a weak one that would give way to warlordism. 

The balance worked for well over a century, until the late 70s when Kabul tried to modernize the country. The state’s presence and purview increased – and so did local resentments and in time rebellions. Foreign countries intervened. Afghanistan has known nothing but war ever since. 

A return?  

Re-establishing that balance will not be easy. Kabul over the years has established officials in the provinces and districts, though they’ve been driven out of several because of their corruption and incompetence. Indeed, corruption is one of the principal reasons for the Taliban’s resurgence. Its courts are often considered fairer than those of the central government. Venal and inept as they are, local officials will try to keep their posts – and their hands on development aid.

The balance between Kabul and the localities depended on arrangements made with local notables – tribal chiefs and trusted elders. Many have been killed or gone off to other countries over the years, leaving less obliging figures in their place. A spirit of compromise has been replaced by what’s been called here “amoral tribalism”, whereby local powerholders have little regard for those outside their district, let alone for the nation as a whole.

Relations between tribes and ethnic groups was never harmonious. Two generations of war have sharpened regional tensions. Which group has collaborated with the Taliban? Which with Kabul? And which with Pakistani intelligence? Animosities between the Pashtun south and the more heterogeneous north flared as the government portioned out high offices and generalships to rivalrous groups, and then reapportioned them. Disbursing reconstruction aid will be just as contentious.

International presences 

Foreign powers have been vying with each other inside Afghanistan since the days of the Great Game when British and Russian officers feuded and plotted along the frontiers of their far-flung empires. 

Pakistan and India were on opposite sides during the Soviet war of the 80s. Today Pakistan supports the Pashtun-led Taliban while India supports the northern peoples. Pakistan also supports several terrorist groups in eastern Afghanistan, including al Qaeda, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and Lashkar-e-Taiba, which train guerrillas to fight in Indian-administered Kashmir. Lashkar-e-Taiba was responsible for the deadly Mumbai attack in 2008.

A settlement in Afghanistan would almost certainly recognize autonomy for the Pashtun south and east. To the south, Pakistan’s Pashtun tribes have been fighting for autonomy since the days of British rule. Pashtun tribes on both sides of the Durand Line may seek their own country, much to the dismay of both Kabul and Islamabad. India will encourage it, Pakistan will scurry to prevent it.  

Saudi Arabia and Iran are also involved in Afghanistan. Riyadh has been supportive of ISIL pockets which they hope will gather various Islamist groups, especially the ones in the east, and wage jihad against Iran. Meanwhile to the north, Iran has long had influence with Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras. 

Russia has developed ties with Tajik and Uzbek leaders. In recent years Russia has delivered arms to the Taliban in order to bleed and humiliate the US and establish a measure of cordiality with them. Moscow sees the Taliban as moderate by Islamist standards and hence willing to prevent more radical groups such as ISIL from consolidating and spreading north into the Near Abroad.  

China has been developing Afghanistan’s iron, copper, and oil resources for over a decade now. It has also built export routes. One runs north into Uzbekistan then east to China, another leads west to Iranian ports, and a third stretches south to Pakistan’s harbors. China will have to be moderator-in-chief for contentious Afghan groups and for the foreign countries contending inside what is becoming wholly integrated into the Chinese sphere. The increased presence of Chinese engineers, workers, administrators, and possibly troops will breed resentments. It might also set the stage for a third Afghan war.

© 2020 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.