President Trump, national security institutions, and the GIs

Brian M Downing 

Donald Trump promised to shake things up in Washington and he’s certainly done that. The complete pullout from Syria and the partial one from Afghanistan brought resignations in Washington and consternation in other capitals. 

National security hands are wary of what’s ahead. Most regard military interventions as routine policies – ones they have proprietary mastery of. Presidents and publics are supposed to listen intently to them and in time appreciate their vision and craftsmanship. GIs hardly figure in the calculations, except as statistics. 

Founders of our country wanted to avoid foreign entanglements. We should trade with the world and demonstrate the virtues of representative government. Europe was home to dynastic rulers, warrior-nobilities, and standing armies which were engines of despotism. But later conflicts, especially the Civil War and World War Two, popularized war. Millions took active part, tens of millions contributed to the national effort and enjoyed the exhilaration of victory.

Vietnam was long, costly, and unsuccessful. Conscription was passionately opposed, then greatly reduced. It ended in early 1973. Service was no longer a civic duty. For most, it was a public spectacle. Today, fewer Americans than ever know someone in the armed forces.

Among senior officers, support for interventionism comes and goes. After the negotiated end to the unpopular Korean War in 1953, General Matthew Ridgway all but engraved “No Land War in Asia” above Pentagon entrances. Not long thereafter, however, the Vietnam war began and after its grim ending, another generation of generals had become wary of interventionism. When ordered in the 80s to draw up plans to invade Nicaragua, a small, nearby objective, they repeatedly called for more time. Prior to the First Gulf War in 1991, generals insisted on obtaining public support, mobilizing reserve units, and stating limited goals and an exit plan. 

These generals have gone into retirement, replaced by a cohort that sees few limitations on their institution’s abilities. The rank and file is another matter. They face frequent deployments into Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, the Baltic states, Central Europe, and East Asia. 

Health suffers. PTSD stays hidden. Divorce lawyers set up shop in strip malls outside Bragg, Lejeune, Vandenberg, and Oceania. Fatigue is more pronounced among special forces and pilots. The latter conduct long missions far from home in aging planes. Accident rates are up. Reenlistments are not. Little wonder that Libertarian candidates calling for reduced foreign commitments do surprisingly well with active-duty troops.

The hardships of soldiers were unlikely to have figured in the president’s decision to withdraw from Syria and Afghanistan. The troops that greeted him in Iraq this week were buoyed by the break from tedium, support for his goals of restoring national greatness, and perhaps a fetching First Lady. Some enthusiasm, however, was based on the hope that they’d be spending more time at home in coming years. 

© 2018 Brian M Downing 

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.