Brian M Downing
After Prigozhin’s putsch last June, the over-under on his days wasn’t high. Wagering ended yesterday with an air disaster northwest of Moscow, probably a large bomb. As noted here right after the putsch, Stalin eventually got to Trotsky and Prigozhin wouldn’t last as long. But there are three possible culprits.
Ukrainian special forces have assassinated figures inside Russia. However, Kyiv probably thought Prigozhin was a welcome source of turmoil in its foe. The Russian army may have acted without Putin’s knowledge to terminate a rival that shot down one of its command planes. Independent action is unlikely in an iron-fisted system. Odds are Putin himself gave the order. He’s killed numerous opponents in the last year alone and Prigozhin’s march on Moscow embarrassed an unforgiving man.
What does this mean for Putin and his war?
The war
The Russian army remains deficient in training, leadership, and motivation. The Wagner Group and Airborne units have been the exceptions. Though their gains around Bakhmut have been slight, they demonstrated surprising determination. Wagner forces are thought to now be in several Belarusian garrisons.
Putin and his generals have far fewer reliable troops now. If Ukrainian forces affect breakthroughs around Bakhmut or the land bridge, there may not be enough reserves to shore things up. Kyiv recognizes this and will likely press all the harder in both areas, though the Pentagon notes the land bridge’s primacy.
At present, public discontent is low and manageable. Russians still understand things as a new Great Patriotic War against traditional Western enemies. Prigozhin’s death will increase discontent. Flowers are piling up outside his headquarters in St Petersburg. He was seen as a fierce warrior who brought welcome advances after a year of failure and who courageously criticized the army’s shortcomings and the dearth of privileged children in the fray.
The group
Without masters, what will become of the legions of samurai? Putin may try once again to integrate Wagner soldiers into the regular army. The first attempt led to refusals, then the putsch. Many Wagnerians are angry at the murder of the two principal Valkyries, Prigozhin and Utkin, and all the more so by another threat of liquidation. Some are calling for armed resistance. Putin would be foolish to take tens of thousands of troops away from present positions and attack Wagnerians in defensive positions. Some Wagner troops are now convoying toward Russia.
Belarus’s dictator, Alexander Lukashenko, may want their services. The mercenaries would give him formidable repressive capacity and higher prestige, at least in his estimation. His public, still irked by a rigged election, may deeply resent such a move. They are already displeased by the presence of unruly Russian ex-cons coarsened by war and accustomed to soldierly privileges.
Putin must contend with the Wagner Group’s considerable presence abroad. They keep sympathetic rulers in power, counter forces of jihad and democracy alike, and place resources in the Sino-Russian sphere. They also bring revenue into Russian coffers and Putin’s pockets. This is in doubt.
The decapitation of the Wagner leadership opens the way for distant commanders to become independent warlords. They may rely on the Group’s assets, including gold mines, to support themselves. They may align directly with local dictators who are appreciative of help in keeping order and lean more toward Beijing than Moscow. This would mean Putin would have less revenue for himself and less utility to China.
©2023 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.