Putin and the long war, part two

Brian M Downing 

Army morale

The troops that began the war were ill trained, badly led, and poorly equipped. They performed dismally. Hard experiences have made them more effective. They’re no longer taking casualties in static positions and stalled convoys. They’re taking enemy positions and meting out punishment. There are signs of progress – a morale-booster.

The boost may be limited in scope and short-lived. Progress in the Donbas has been about 270 meters a day and has come at high cost. There’s no sign of momentum but Moscow expects its troops to keep up the pace, despite high casualties and little rest. Stalemate is on and winter on the steppes is coming. 

Manpower 

A long war with significant casualties causes problems, especially without ongoing progress. Putin is reluctant to go on a war footing and delve deep into conscription. That would undermine claims of having the war under control and would take experienced leaders out of combat units and into training units.

Putin has instead ordered regional officials to assemble volunteer units through patriotic appeals and pay incentives. Enlistment periods are four to twelve months – not enough time to make effective troops. Recruitment has been most successful in poorer, Asian regions.

The home front  

The effect of sanctions has been offset by higher energy prices. Prices are slumping now. Hi-tech items are getting scarce, financial institutions are boxed in, and trade is slowing down. The World Bank sees Russian GDP falling 11% by next year.

The EU is gradually reducing Russian energy imports. That will pose serious problems for Europeans as they look to the Gulf, Mediterranean, and N America. That will take several months and cause political-economic trouble, but it will end. Russia will not regain anything near its present market share as long as its troops are in Ukraine. 

Declining export revenue weakens the state. It has less money for investments, subsidies, social projects, foreign aid, and of course the war. The Kremlin must recall that during its Afghan war in the 1980s, Gulf states boosted production to hurt the invaders. It worked. (The Gulf states today have no interest in weakening Russia.)

The Kremlin today will inform its subjects that Western machinations caused the hardship and they must endure it and support the war all the more. It’s best for the nation and world peace too.

Support is likely to remain in Putin’s favor. Most Russians have no direct involvement in the war and most accept war myths and official statements. A long war, however, will pose problems.

A credibility gap may emerge as official assurances are undermined by the war going into winter and the new year. The idea of a special military operation, not a war, may become an object of bitter derision.

Soldiers in the field and vets back home are giving frank, discouraging accounts of the war – inept leaders, resolute enemy, and hostile civilians. The accounts will be whispered in gatherings and become a corrosive counter-narrative.

The military may need to go deeper into the draft pool. Urban middle-classes may be called upon. Many of them have been hieing since February for the EU to avoid possible conscription. Those still at home may resist. 

The burden of war is being assumed by young men from working-class and poor backgrounds. By next year whispers of a “poor man’s war” and privileged political and business elites may become a source of discontent.

Official casualty reports, when offered, are far lower than Western estimates. The Kremlin says only one crewman was killed in Moskva’s putative accident. Family members who try to learn more are told to back down. People can become inured to lies and cant from leaders. However, deception regarding war casualties is unpardonable and corrosive.

©2022 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.