Russia, Georgia, and NATO: Cold War Two

Brian M Downing 

The Russian invasion of the S. Ossetian enclave in Georgia should call into question a basic component of US foreign policy – the integration of Eastern Europe and former Soviet republics into NATO.  This policy has been pursued by Democratic and Republican administrations, but with no public debate and with little thought as to the long-term consequences.  The consequences are now becoming clear, and they are unpleasant.  

The attack signals several Russian positions.  Russia will intervene in foreign countries to protect ethnic Russians living there.  Russia can readily control or even cut off important oil pipelines connecting the resources of Central Asia to western markets, one of which of course runs through Georgia.  The attack also signals Russia’s displeasure with NATO expansion into Eastern Europe and former Soviet Republics.  Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, NATO has taken under its increasingly expansive wing Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovenia.  Georgia plans to join in the next few years.

This process has been going on for fifteen years, under the Clinton and Bush administrations.  And it is as ill thought out as any foreign policy the US has pursued in decades.  The American public greeted each new NATO member as though they were new neighbors, not as distant and even remote countries we were now obliged to defend.  NATO is a mutual defense pact.  Members are required to go to war if a member is attacked.    

Nor was the effect on Russia thought out.  As is well known – though not well comprehended – Russian history is filled with periodic devastating invasions, from Germany (twice), France, Sweden, and the Mongols.  Russian governments, and the public as well, look upon events on their periphery with concerns and fears that people of a country sharing borders with Canada and Mexico cannot understand.  NATO forces, pressing steadily deeper into what Russia thought to be a defensive glacis from a resurgent Germany, set off alarms in the Russian bureaus and public alike, thereby contributing to the return to authoritarian government based on national security and militarism.  

In retrospect, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, an agreement should and probably could have been reached between Russian and NATO powers, which banned each power’s forces from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Republics.  But that was not pursued and here we stand at the dangerous intersection of a heedless NATO policy and a timeless Russian mindset.

In the aftermath of the Ossetian intervention, Americans might well ask themselves if they are willing to go to war to defend remote countries for whom they have little obligation, except what stems from those countries having been persuaded to send troops to Iraq in exchange for some assurance of US/NATO protection.  It’s unclear if the people of western Europe, who are less enamored by war than Americans are, and who look at least somewhat more thoughtfully on world affairs, are asking themselves the same question.

Perhaps recent events can lead to a negotiated demilitarization of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Republics, as should have taken place fifteen years ago.  It is more probable, however, that events in Georgia will lead to more rapid military modernization in new NATO members and a few more countries applying for membership (tuition-free, of course).  This in turn will intensify Russian security concerns and authoritarian trends as well – dynamics that were likely foreseen by President Putin.  A new Cold War has begun.  

~ ©2008 Brian M Downing