Brian M Downing
Russia is headed for defeat in Ukraine. Sanctions are weakening the economy and even choking off arms production. The army is being attritted by a more disciplined and better equipped adversary. Money’s drying up and default looms. By year’s end Russia may be struggling to hold on to the east and Crimea.
Unsuccessful wars weaken governments. Fissures deepen between elites. Finances become uncertain. Criticisms become more open. World War One brought down three imperial dynasties, including the Romanovs.
Democratic movements can make their way to power: Germany after 1918 and 1945, Argentina after the Falklands War in 1981. What are the prospects for that in Russia? Even if the war ends in serious defeat, support for democracy will not be strong. Russia has no shadow government and it will not be occupied by Western democracies.
Democracy in Russia
Many parts of the world respect and revere democracy. It’s considered a natural culmination point in political development. Authoritarian governments will inevitably give way to representative government.
Inasmuch as democracies are less warlike than autocracies, a liberal Russian government would be welcome. However, respect for democracy has never been strong in Russia. In traditionalist circles, democracy is a foreign toxin that poisons centuries-old ways with organic roots. Democracy brings decadence and sinfulness, confusion and turmoil.
Experiences with democracy were brief and disappointing. They brought upper-class manipulation, dangerous paralysis, pointless debates, and manufactured support for regimes. Kerensky’s government failed in 1917 and was ousted by the Bolsheviks. Yeltsin’s fared only somewhat better in the 90s and Putin took over.
Russians prefer strong leaders (vozhds). Autocrats, even harsh ones, keep order, fend off invaders, and preserve organic Russian ideals. Dmitri Donskoi stared down the Mongols on the steppes, Nevsky defeated the German Order on a frozen lake, and Stalin pushed the Reich back from the gates of Moscow. They are widely revered to this day. Kerensky and Yeltsin are largely forgotten.
Defeat and repression
Democratic forces will be widely though falsely blamed for defeat. They were disloyal to the state and supportive of the enemy. They spread alarm, fear, and falsehoods in the public and even in the rank and file. Russia was stabbed in the back.
Regardless of the severity of defeat, the state and its repressive capacity aren’t likely to collapse as in 1917 and 1991. They are thoroughly indoctrinated, regularly paid, and mindful of precedents. The army and various security bureaus will prevent disorder and quash democratic pressures from Duma factions, remaining independent media, and westernized middle classes.
A harsh crackdown will find broad public support. Many veterans and their families will eagerly embrace the stab-in-the-back myth and applaud the vengeance the state metes out.
Defeat is more likely to strengthen authoritarianism, militarism, and xenophobia. Russia will look more like it was in the Brezhnev era, if not earlier. Popular support for the state may be reduced in number by disaffection with the war, but intensified in venom by senses of betrayal.
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Paradoxically, a strengthened authoritarian regime brings at least some benefits to Ukraine and the West. It will be easier to keep most sanctions in effect for years to come. Russian revenue and resources will be limited, as will hopes of rebuilding and reforming its damaged army.
Next: authoritarian rule with or without Putin
©2022 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.