Russia sees opportunity in Turkey’s instability

Russia sees opportunity in Turkey’s instability

Brian M Downing

Russia and Turkey have been enemies since the early tsars pushed south from Muscovy and came up against the Ottomans. Numerous conflicts followed, including the Crimean War of the 1850s and World War One which saw the collapse of dynasties in both empires. Following World War Two, and with the advent of the Cold War, Turkey became an important NATO member – one whose authoritarianism was at odds with European democracies but which was nonetheless acceptable.

Russia and Turkey are on opposite sides of the Syrian civil war, with Russia losing a fighter jet to Turkish fire last year. The two countries were speaking more cordially in recent weeks, as they rely on trade with one another. The recent failed coup in Turkey, and the government’s heavy-handed reaction against the officer corps, universities, judiciary, and media offer opportunities for Russia to weaken NATO, one way or another.

Encouraging the Kurds 

Russia in recent months has supported Syrian Kurds with airstrikes and chided Ankara for its senseless repression of its large Kurdish population. This of course greatly worried Ankara as it suggested the possibility of open support for the PKK, perhaps including arms. This could lead to an even more violent insurgency and the loss of southeastern Turkey.

While this has attractions in Moscow, it presents risks for allies in Iran and Syria which also have restive Kurdish regions. Supporting the PKK would lead to greater enmity with Turkey – this at a time when turmoil offers the opportunity for further weakening the country by enticing parts of the political divide.

The known danger of Russian support for the PKK may encourage Erdogan and his rivals to avoid antagonizing Russia and to see advantages in cooperation.

Attracting Erdogan

The president of Turkey is at odds with the West, especially the US. He sees them as supporting the failed coup against him and the US is singled out for offering sanctuary to his former ally turned enemy – Fethullah Gulen. The West is also the wellspring of the secularism and moral laxity that his party opposes His country’s admission to the EU is as good as dead.

Russia will support Erdogan’s defiance of the West and his social conservatism which resonates with Moscow’s view of European and American social decay, and Russia’s mission of upholding civilization.

Russia’s economic sphere cannot rival the EU, but it can offer opportunities in Iran and Central Asia which China is developing. Beijing is already planning export routes through Pakistan and Iran. Turkey would provide access to the Mediterranean and Europe. Ceyhan is today an export terminal for the oil of Kurdistan and Kazakhstan.

Moscow can also offer a prominent place in negotiations for a settlement in Syria – one that places Ankara on the same level if not ahead of Washington.

Attracting the opposition

The religious nature of Erdogan’s popular support, and his ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, might be offputting to Moscow. It is uncomfortably close to the Islamism that simmers in Chechnya, Dagestan, and throughout Central Asia. Russia, then, might prefer ties with the secular forces, especially rival parties and the generals who are being marginalized by Erdogan’s countercoup.

The US supports the more secular forces but will be reluctant to irritate Erdogan too much as it relies on Turkish airfields for the air campaign against ISIL – and it does not want to provide further incentive for an opening to Russia.

The US dislikes the religious-authoritarian moves Erdogan has taken over the years, especially in recent weeks, but it does not want to overturn democratic processes by supporting a more skillfully organized coup. Russia has no such reluctance.

Copyright 2016 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.