Sources of legitimacy and vulnerability in Putin’s Russia, part one

Brian M Downing 

Spirited demonstrations are rocking Moscow. The crowds are angry over the summary arrest of Alexei Navalny. The formidable critic of Putin’s autocracy was almost certainly poisoned at Putin’s decree yet he returned to build opposition. The demonstrators are courageous. The jarring youth movements in many parts of the world have given Russians a sense that their time has come. But change isn’t likely in the near future.   

Putin lays claim to invigorating the Russian economy and restoring its power prestige in the world – both of which had collapsed in 1991. He will employ a rolling crackdown against demonstrators – arresting several hundred demonstrators at a time but refraining from a Bloody Sunday moment that damages his image and encourages stronger opposition. It’s working in Hong Kong and Belarus.

Biden will have to counter with a consistent, longterm policy. Putin has invaded the Crimea and eastern Ukraine – and annexed the former. His cyberwarfare units undermine democracy in the US, Britain, and elsewhere. His forces bomb Syrian civilians and look on as Syrian allies use chemical weapons. He works with China to expand power in African and S American states. He kills opponents, often relatively minor ones, at home and abroad. That’s more than autocracy, it’s derangement.

What are the bases of Putin’s power? Will a second round of containment work? Are there more artful policies that will undermine him and strengthen opposition?

Defending the homeland

Russia and the Soviet Union have suffered devastating invasions – the Mongols in the 13th century, the Poles in the 17th, France in the 19th, and the Third Reich in the 20th. Estimates vary widely but Soviet deaths in World War Two are probably about 27 million. The Great Patriotic War, as it’s called, melded the experiences of living family members with lore of past wars, forming a powerful cultural reservoir tapped by leaders.

The collapse of the USSR in 1991 led to the loss of buffer states in Eastern Europe (nominal allies in the Warsaw Pact), the breakdown of the nation’s military, and political disarray. Russia was again vulnerable. Indeed, a narrative quickly emerged that blamed Russia’s sorrowful condition on foreign intrigue aimed at depriving it of a rightful place in the world. (Eastern Europe’s hostility after decades of Soviet occupation barely registers inside Russia.)

Putin became the nation’s leader in 2000 and set to work reestablishing national power. He rebuilt the military, or at least conspicuous parts of it, and presented an image of restored greatness. More than symbolic, elite Russian units invaded the Crimea and eastern Ukraine.

Further, he’s used his military to harass American and other NATO forces along the Russian periphery and strengthened his position in the Middle East. Russia is once again respected and feared. The Russian people enjoy the power prestige their nation had after defeating the Third Reich.

Bringing prosperity

Along with communism’s fall came the collapse of the centrally-planned economy. Russian GDP had been in decline beforehand, but the slope sharpened and the economy fell 37% between 1991 and 1998, before beginning to recover late in Yeltsin’s rule.

Growth continued under Putin, reaching 1991 levels in 2006 and more than doubling from the nadir by 2015. There are several causes: political and financial order, foreign investment, but most importantly rising oil prices. Putin reasserted control of key industries, especially oil and mining sectors, which had been sold off to private investors in rigged auctions. Consistent with Russia’s former ideology, he expropriated the expropriators. 

Putin presents himself as the good tsar, protecting the people from disloyal aristocrats aligned with foreign powers. He has shown more of a common touch, usually in staged events, than any communist or Romanov predecessor.

Sense of well-being is up. So is life expectancy, which had been in startling decline. Putin burnishes his image with displays of virility on horseback and astride motorcycles, and with ceremonial shows of respect to the Orthodox Church which confer an aura of national continuity and mission. (The Church has historically supported powerful rulers and feared the West.)

Putin presents himself as the incarnation of a great Russian vozhd – the powerful and often harsh leader of the Russian nation who protects it from internal and foreign dangers. He prides himself as a successor to Josef Stalin. In coming years, however, his image and pride can be chipped away.

© 2021 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.