Syria moves to retake Deraa and the south

Brian M Downing 

The Syrian civil war appears to be moving into a final chapter, though the region’s conflicts are prone to sudden addendums. Government forces, with the aid of Russian airpower and Iranian-trained militias, are moving on Idlib in the north and Deraa in the south. The latter campaign will bring them close to Israeli positions on the Golan Heights which was taken from Syria in the ’67 War.

At the outset of the civil war, Israel, acting in concert with Saudi Arabia and other Sunni monarchies, tried to convince Assad to break with Iran. He declined and a ruinous war ensued. Israel’s position shifted to pressing the large Druze population just east of Golan to declare autonomy and live under IDF protection. The Druze declined. The view here has long been that Israel would not allow Assad’s forces to retake the Druze region. Is Israel allowing Syrian troops so close to its border? If so, why and what are the dangers?

East of Golan

The earliest protests in Syria’s Arab Spring took place in Deraa. Since then, the city and its environs, only some thirty miles south of Damascus, have seen various rebel groups come and go. Today, ISIL, the FSA, and others hold patches of territory there. Syrian troops are besieging Deraa and Russian aircraft are pounding civilian targets, including hospitals – a tactic that worked well at Aleppo and Damascus. 

Israel has been thus far silent, even though Syrian columns are coming within range of IDF artillery and even though the campaign violates agreements on deconfliction zones. The security situation east of Golan has been reassessed. 

The Syria that Israel fought in 1948, 1967, and 1973 no longer exists and is unlikely to return. It has broken into a Shia region, a Turkish enclave to the north, and Kurdish-Arab regions stretching along the Turkish and Iraqi borders under US-UK protection. The economy is destroyed, much of its oil is under rebel control, and Damascus will be unable to call upon its Sunni population for military service in the foreseeable future. Better from Israel’s perspective for a Syrian border  under Assad than a lawless tract where groups such as ISIL can forge ties with inhabitants of the West Bank.

Russia and Iran

Syria would not be nearing Golan without the approval of Russia, which in turn would have gotten Israel’s consent. Perhaps there was a quid pro quo of permitting Syria to retake Deraa and surroundings in exchange for Russian help in reducing or eliminating Iran’s presence in Syria. Israel’s airstrikes on an Iranian arms cache south of Damascus that was earmarked for Hisbollah underscored its opposition to an Iranian presence. Attacks on a nearby Iranian base at Kiswah took place last December and may be repeated soon. 

The campaign for Deraa apparently uses no Iranian troops, though Iranian-trained militias are in evidence. They may be acceptable to Israel, at least for the time being. But once the region is secure, attacks may come – an addendum authored in Jerusalem. 

Why is Syria using Iran’s proxies? It might be a sign of just how depleted the regular army is. It’s been unable to rely on Sunni troops since the fighting began. Shia casualties over the years are not reliably known but must be high. State media diligently refrain from showing frontline troops, preferring instead to show joyous victors with clean-shaven faces and tidy uniforms. Perhaps Syria has borrowed the Russian word “Potemkinism”. Alternately, Damascus, annoyed by Russia’s coziness with Israel, is testing how much it can get away with. 

Another source of trouble is the Syrian army’s recent occupation of an abandoned UN observation post along Golan. Though hardly a fortified position, the occupation has brought warnings from Israel. Assad can only go so far as Netanyahu wants him to remain a weak, fearful neighbor.

Copyright 2018 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks to Susan Ganosellis.