The Great Patriotic War and Putin’s agenda, part two

Brian M Downing

The Great Patriotic War reverberates in the Russian soul. At times, it thunders. Official ceremonies see to that but memories of 20-27 million deaths do more. The lower estimate is 15 times the American losses. Family lore recounts experiences, hardships, and deaths. To paraphrase Faulkner, the past war isn’t dead. It isn’t even past.

People understand ongoing wars in terms of previous ones. Putin knows that. He, his generals, and his state describe, at very turn and in fiery rhetoric, parallels between the war against Germany and the one on Ukraine – in public statements, at stadium rallies, and on television programs. Responses are effusive. Maintaining the public’s connection to the Great Patriotic War is crucial to keeping support for the present one. Putin knows that too.

Justification

The buildup to the February invasion entailed deployment of troops and rationales. Ukraine was a neo-Nazi state posing a danger to the Motherland and oppressing its own people and Russian minorities as well. It was necessary to preempt another devastating invasion like Barbarossa in 1941 (whose anniversary is June 22).

Justifications stir support and maintain it as the war goes on, perhaps into next year. More importantly, justifications are crucial to the fighting spirit of frontline troops. They are not well-trained and trust in fellow soldiers and officers isn’t high. They’re energized by nationalist furor and opportunities for mayhem.

The war promises the Russian people the restoration of imperial glory, as when the Red Army took Eastern Europe and Berlin and the world trembled. Hence the hammer and sickle flags and warnings to Eastern Europe. The appeal is important in a collapsed state reasserting itself and proving its worth to a powerful ally in the East.

Conduct

The war began with attempted blitzkrieg but it failed. The war in the Donbas reprises the method of the the 1940s: concentrated artillery bombardments pounding the enemy until they have to retreat. That’s the Russian way of war. Zhukov won out over Guderian.

Cities are leveled, civilian deaths mean nothing, and unreliable locals are deported to remote regions across the Urals. What happened to Mariupol and Severodonetsk will be visited on every Ukrainian city. That’s what happened to Leningrad and Stalingrad, then to every city on the way to Berlin. 

Morale  

Putin promised a quick war. Kyiv would fall in days and the rest of the country would soon capitulate. That didn’t happen and a grinding war has ensued. A credibility problem loomed for the Kremlin. The memory of the Great Patriotic War offers help.  

Initial disappointments can be laid at the boots of a fanatical, neo-Nazi enemy. The Reich fought savagely and had help from Finland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Italy, and Spain. Neo-Nazi successors in Ukraine are no less savage and are tellingly aided by many of the Reich’s old allies – NATO powers, who provide vital information and shuttle in deadly weapons. It took years to attain victory over the Reich. Russia’s ability to endure hardship will see this war out too.  

Stalin hunted down internal enemies aligned with the West. Show trials brought swift executions. The public was awed. Putin will place Ukrainian and allied prisoners before similar tribunals. They will be presented as neo-Nazis and war criminals. The trials will be a warning to domestic dissenters and hooligans.

* * *

Basing the present war on a past one will help Putin maintain support and stifle opposition, at least for a while, but it can be problematic, even ruinous. History offers insights, not templates. Imperial dreams can be delusional, especially if conjured by an all-powerful figure unrestrained by checks and balances, independent-minded ministers and generals, or even a calculating politburo.

©2022 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.