Brian M Downing
The war in Yemen has been stalemated for two years now. Shia-Houthi forces drove swiftly to the south but were halted and driven back. Sunni forces, indigenous and foreign, have made very little headway, despite significant advantages in airpower, logistics, foreign backing, and numbers.
The war has become a human rights disaster and a growing embarrassment to backers of the Saudi camp. Stalemates bring changes. The anti-Prussian coalition fell apart during the Seven Years War. Amid the interminable trench warfare of the First World War, Italy switched sides and the German home front crumbled.
The Sunni camp in South Yemen is breaking down. Factions are fighting each other and grabbing turf where they can. This is the best news in years and it bodes well for Yemen – and the whole region.
The war
The latest fighting between North and South Yemen grew out of turmoil brought on by the Arab Spring, of course, but also of concerns of rising Saudi influence. Riyadh had long been subsiding schools and mosques which taught its intolerant Wahhabi creed, and made numerous other investments to build popular support.
It worked well but resentments grew, chiefly in the Shia north. The Houthi movement grew, rebelled, and drove Saudi-backed troops out of the north. The Houthis drove deep into the South and neared Aden.
Sunni forces, backed by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and their western arms suppliers, scrambled to bolster the South. They tried to get Pakistan and Egypt to send troops but both declined, even though they are handsomely subsidized by the oil powers. Colombian mercenaries were recruited but became an embarrassment. The UAE has sent its ground troops into combat. Saudi troops stay in the rear with the gear, as the GI saying goes. Saudi money enticed Sudan to send a small contingent.
The split
The war drags on, casualties mount, and the Sunni alliance is coming apart. The cause is in part the inherent fractiousness of the South’s tribes and towns. More importantly, the Emiratis and Saudis have different war aims. The Emiratis seek a partitioning of the country. The Saudis want to press on until the Shia are vanquished. The Emiratis might also fear Saudi dominance in the region. Other countries should look into that.
The view here has long been in support of partitioning. Yemen is an artificial creation of the post-colonial era. The North had been part of the Ottoman Empire, the South a British protectorate. The current war is the third since the sixties. In an earlier conflict the Saudis backed the Shia North – a clear sign that we are dealing with transitory alignments.
Partition would end much of the fighting and allow each side to rebuild and consolidate. This is crucial in the South where ISIL and al Qaeda control territory and cities, and have become intertwined with several tribes. Indeed, those groups have ingratiated themselves with some Southern forces by assassinating Houthi leaders and bombing Shia marketplaces.
Today, Saudi and Emirati factions are scrambling to grab territory and coalesce support. The Emiratis have the upper hand as they have experienced combat troops on hand and substantial popular support from supporters of separation from the North. Aden fell to them today.
The opposition
Saudi Arabia rejects the Emirates’ proposal of dividing Yemen and wants to continue the war. The youthful prince is driven by personal ambition and religious hatred. He feels a calling to expand his realm’s influence, weaken Shia apostates, and restore Arab greatness. He’s failed in Syria and his Iran policy is stalled. He must not fail in Yemen.
The prince could deploy his own troops. The Saudis have some 400,000 troops armed with the best equipment petrodollars can buy. However, the army is led by men who ascended the ranks not by professional qualifications but by personal ties with the royal family. The rank and file comprise numerous tribes and clans that do not trust one another – anathema to unit cohesion. Who knows how the restive youth cohort would react to high, sustained casualties against the experienced, homogeneous Houthis.
Alternately, the prince could try once more to convince Egypt and Pakistan to send troops. His checkbook’s out, his pen in hand. But the war looks like a quagmire and perhaps a lost cause too. Another possibility is getting the US to deploy a couple divisions. Naturally, the prince would assure President Trump that the deployment would be a brief and would bring him greater respect, at home and abroad. The White House foreign policy team is short on practical people just now.
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Conflict within the Sunni alliance is welcome news. That doesn’t come out of the region very often these days. The Emiratis will likely soon announce talks to bring about partition, which is the best way to end the war. The EU will likely support the talks, as will Iran, Qatar, and many other countries out of the region. The US should as well but given the administration’s hostility toward Iran and the Houthis, that’s unlikely.
Checking Mohammad bin Salman’s ambition and power is vital. Only thirty-three, he could rule the kingdom for the next sixty years and expand his power throughout the Middle East. Powers in and out of the region would do well to support the Emiratis and other Gulf countries in their effort to limit his power – now.
© 2019 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.