Russia has sent aircraft and support personnel to hold up the faltering Assad regime. Its fighters and cruise missiles have attacked rebel positions, chiefly non-ISIL ones. Russian troops are defending bases along the Mediterranean and “volunteers” ground forces are being organized though not yet deployed.
The US and NATO are parleying to find an adequate response. Thus far, NATO has bolstered air defense systems in Eastern Europe and underscored its standing pledge to support Turkey if attacked. Many will call for a stronger response, but subtler options are available, as are substantial ones from non-NATO members.
Rebel groups
Rebel forces in Syria agree on little, but there’s no debate as to whose bombs and missiles have begun to rain down upon them. Indeed, rebel commanders have called for a unified response and though one is unlikely, there will be independent efforts to strike at Russian forces based along the Mediterranean at Tartus and Latakia. Those facilities are undoubtedly well guarded but they are not invulnerable.
Rebel forces come from many parts of the Islamic world, including Chechnya – the tumultuous region in the Russian Caucasus. Estimates range from several hundred to a few thousand. There are also experienced fighters in Chechnya and adjacent restive Islamic areas, who are undoubtedly incensed by Moscow’s attacks.
Far to the east of the Caucasus, and far out of mind to most observers, are Islamist forces in Central Asia, home to the former Soviet republics of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Those areas, just to the north of Taliban operations in northern Afghanistan, have simmering ethnic and political troubles that fuel Islamist militancy. Indeed, Tajikistan’s security chief recently quit his post and joined ISIL. Russian troops battled Islamist insurgents there in the nineties; they are being positioned to respond there again.
Sunni powers
Russia has been making inroads into the American partnership with Sunni states in the Gulf. They are annoyed by Washington’s support for democracy in the region and its opening to Iran. Russian arms have been finding avid buyers in the Gulf.
The Sunni states now worry that Russia is siding with the Shia powers of Syria, Iran, Lebanon, and Iraq. These countries are seen not only as geopolitical rivals but as loathsome heretics, with Russia acting perfidiously on their behalf.
The Sunni states will also respond by providing more money and arms to rebels, cutting arms purchases from Russia, and possibly by increasing oil production. Russia’s two chief export items are oil and weapons, so these Sunni actions may badly worsen Russia’s already frail economy.
The US and NATO
As significant as the likely responses of rebel groups and Sunni powers are, the US and NATO will likely feel the need to show displeasure in more ways than token troop movements and strong words.
Russia’s use of fighter aircraft in Syria will naturally bring up recollections of the American shoulder-fired missiles (Stingers) given to the Afghan mujahideen in the eighties. The US, however, is loth to dispense those weapons to groups with dubious longterm agendas. Furthermore, and paradoxically given the US concern, there’s no evidence that Russia lost more aircraft once the Stingers were given to Afghan guerrillas.
NATO might ask Turkey, an alliance member, to embark on a program of harassing Russian jets near its border, by intercepting them or locking ground radar onto them. Turkey has a long and unpleasant relationship with Russia going back to Ottoman days, and having been insulted by recent provocations by Russian jets, will need little prodding from Washington or Brussels.
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The options before rebel groups, Sunni states, and NATO are quite formidable – with little overt US action entailed. So formidable and obvious to a clever statesman like Putin, so ominous the possibility of a protracted ground war, that one might suspect that his objectives are less far-reaching than thought. He may be to impress upon rebel groups and their backers that Assad will not fall and that negotiations should be pursued.
Whatever Putin’s goals are, Washington’s response should be based on the recognition that time and regional actors are against him.
©2015 Brian M Downing
Putin’s strategy may be ” to impress upon rebel groups and their backers that Assad will not fall and that negotiations should be pursued.” That answers the question regarding Putin’s risk. His goals are not grandiose. Rather, as you indicate, he may just want a deal in Syria rather than an outright defeat. If he’s really clever, he’ll make the obvious point that foreign powers don’t get to choose the new Syrian government. The Syrian people are the true electors and should be give a vote on their next government.
One risk the NATO-Sunni alliance takes may represent a long shot or it may not. With a slow down of arms and personnel via Turkey and Jordan, the rebels may just crumble under the new forces attacking them (particularly if the Chechen Republic sends troops, as they said they’d like to).
These rebels have been fighting with impunity for a long time. What happens if they fold like a cheap card table? Will the Obama administration rush in to aid groups clearly aligned with al Qaeda?
I only suspect that Putin has the limited goal of solidifying Assad then calling for negotiations. Anything more will lead to longterm woes for Russia, in and out of Syria.
Saudi Arabia et al announced they would increase their support for the rebels.