Turkey reaches for greater power

Turkey reaches for greater power 

Brian M Downing

Turkey has long pursued regional interests. It has championed Kurdish autonomy in Iraq, but tries to quash it elsewhere. It has supported a slew of rebel groups in Syria. And it has established itself as an important transporter of Central Asian and Middle Eastern oil. It has occasionally attacked PKK forces in Kurdistan, both with ground troops and airstrikes. More recently, Turkish troops crossed into Syria where in conjunction with the Free Syrian Army, they are establishing a buffer state amid the Kurdish regions along the border. A Turkish protectorate is forming.

This week, President Erdogan has signaled that his troops would play a role in the impending battle for Mosul, ISIL’s prized holding in northern Iraq. Details are unclear. When Iraqi PM Abadi objected to the presence of Turkish troops and their increased role in the ISIL War, Erdogan brushed him off as an insignificant player.

The president is trying to hold together tensions at home, but he’s also seeking to establish his country as a major power.

Domestic politics

Turkey is deeply divided over the role of religion in national life and by the enmity created in last summer’s coup and its aftermath. Erdogan is seeking to move in the direction of a Muslim Brotherhood-type government, while many urban dwellers and government officials want to hold fast to the secularism Ataturk pushed through after World War One. The power prestige of military success, it is hoped, will ease tensions.

There is also conflict within the officer corps, parts of which launched an unsuccessful coup last summer. Erdogan came down hard, ousting thousands of officers and replacing them with more reliable ones. The army is angry. It seeks to protect secularism and its own institutional authority. Military actions abroad may ease the generals’ concerns and solidify the positions of replacements. There is the risk, however, that Erdogan’s appointees will perform poorly and that a protracted war, say, one against Syrian Kurds, will create greater enmity between army and state.

Turkey and Kurdistan

Iraqi Kurds have all but declared an independent state of Kurdistan, free of the Shia Arabs in Baghdad. The Kurds have enjoyed cordial and mutually beneficial relations with Turkey. Kurdish oil flows into the Turkish pipeline system then, for a fee, out to the port of Ceyhan and world markets. In return, the Kurds hire Turkish engineering firms to build infrastructure for the new country.

Turkish troops in Kurdistan tell Baghdad that Kurdistan is outside their control and that efforts to reestablish it will have consequences. If the Iraqi army were to engage Kurdish troops one day, they would be worn down in a matter of months. If Iraqi troops, among the worst in the region, were to clash with Turkish troops, probably the best in the region, they would suffer a serious and debilitating defeat in a few weeks.

Not long after ISIL swept into northern Iraq and seized Mosul, the Kurds drove into Arab lands, pushed ISIL back, and took control of oil fields around Kirkuk, greatly adding to Kurdistan’s proven reserves and Turkey’s pipeline revenue. The oil fields are deeply disputed. Iraq claims them as Arab, Kurdistan insists the Arab population was only recently placed there by Saddam Hussein. The Kurdish position is strong; it’s stronger still with Turkish troops nearby.

The campaign to retake Mosul has been delayed month after month. The outset and costs of the effort are uncertain, the outcome less so. Greatly outnumbered and without air defenses, ISIL will eventually lose Mosul, despite the Islamist group’s qualitative superiority and fortifications. After that, the city will be a bargaining chip in determining the independence of Kurdistan, the ownership of Kirkuk’s oil, and the sectarian composition of Mosul.

Turkey and sectarian conflict

Highly secular since the reforms after defeat in World War One, Turkey under Erdogan has shifted back toward a Sunni-Islam foundation. His ruling party is at least aligned with the international Muslim Brotherhood, which is a major backer of rebel factions in Syria.

Taking part in the Mosul campaign, and insulting Iraq’s PM, inserts Turkey into the Sunni-Shia rivalry in the Middle East. Turkey will be positioned not only to shape the future of Kurdish areas in what was once Iraq, but also that of Anbar province. Sunni Iraqis, only sixteen percent of population, were once masters of the country. After years of insurgency and in the absence of reconciliation, the Sunnis are eager to break free from Baghdad’s rule. They see the Kurds close to independence and want the same for themselves. Turkey has the opportunity for another protectorate, of sorts.

Similarly, Turkey can influence the trajectory of Sunni regions in the former Syria. It will find like-minded figures in Saudi Arabia and other Sunni monarchies eager to strengthen their influence and weaken that of the Shia powers. The struggle is underway to create and control Sunni statelets in the vast area that Damascus and Baghdad have lost control of.

Copyright 2016 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.