The Biden administration is pulling out of Afghanistan. It should have been done ten years ago when it was clear the effort was lost. We were hoping for the best and now must prepare for the worst. The question of who lost Afghanistan, like everything in Washington, will be handled in a boisterous, superficial, partisan manner. It’ll be useless.
George Orwell once said that some ideas are so ridiculous that only a highly-educated person could believe them. It took a great deal of education to get the country to wade into Afghanistan and stay put there for twenty years.
The environment
The decision to occupy Afghanistan, modernize its economy, and liberalize its government was made in atmosphere warped by a thirst to avenge 9/11 and the resurfacing of post-WW2 beliefs that we could accomplish anything in the world. One might have hoped that such naïveté ended with the Vietnam debacle only a quarter century earlier but that was old history and 9/11 changed all that.
One might further have hoped that at least our generals had retained some of the hubris brought by 58,000 dead GIs in Southeast Asia. However, seasoned Vietnam-era flag officers were of dwindling numbers and influence, replaced by a headier generation whose outlooks were made roseate after quick, easy wars in Grenada, Panama, and Kuwait. Winning the Afghan war was simply a matter of allocating resources and seeing it through.
The intelligence
A reasonably informed person, innocent of political pressure and group think, might have looked at a map, reflected on the news over the last decade or two, and thought twice about launching a major political, economic, and military effort in a landlocked, Islamic country surrounded by hostile or untrustworthy states, eager though they were for immediate action. Today our supply lines rely on the good will of Vladimir Putin and Pakistani generals.
Our intelligence community failed to recognize the Pakistani military and intelligence service’s longstanding support for the Taliban. Or worse, it trusted president and former general Pervez Musharraf when he promised his country’s support. Instead, Pakistan has supplied the Taliban, granted it havens, and cut off our supply lines at east twice. Years later Osama bin Laden was found safely ensconced not far from a Pakistani army base.
The intelligence community failed to understand the nature of Afghan society – its fragmentary, rivalrous nature and inbred suspicion of or hostility toward central government. There was little warning that Washington’s modernization effort was bound to cause resentments and violent resistance. Beyond puzzling, this blunder is unforgivable as twenty years earlier the CIA had encouraged local resistance to Kabul and its backers in Moscow and supported a slew of local mujahideen bands.
The faith
After eight years of steady Taliban resurgence, Washington enthusiastically embraced a shift away from conventional combat operations and the adoption of counterinsurgency. It was the smart way to fight wars. It had the allure of unorthodoxy replacing stale doctrines from old wars and youthful innovators triumphing over hidebound superiors.
A charismatic youngish general spread the new doctrine in think tanks and the media, implemented it in Iraq with debatable results, and was confidently dispatched to Afghanistan to turn the tide. Two years later the creed had failed. Programs brought teams of engineers and advisors and supervisors into villages – the same external intrusions that brought turmoil and war when the communists tried to modernize the countryside in the late seventies.
The Kabul government siphoned off money intended for schools and irrigation systems. Tribal elders partook of the bonanza as well. A Pentagon watchdog group’s monthly reports of failures and venality read like hyper-critical accounts from partisan journalists. Pakistan continued to aid the Taliban.
The changed international situation
The US effort initially had broad foreign support – not only NATO but also Iran, Russia, and China. A decade later those three states had become antagonistic.
China’s economic growth brought confidence and determination to replace the US’s position in the world. Russia wanted to restore the power prestige it lost when the Soviet Union collapsed. Beijing and Moscow began to cooperate against the US wherever possible. China’s bribes turned the Afghan government into a loyal dependency. Russia’s aid to the Taliban, limited though it was, won a measure of influence.
Iran helped the US drive out the Taliban and afterward directed development programs in northern and central provinces. Washington soon became antagonistic toward Tehran, threatening regime change, imposing sanctions, and supporting or acceding to bombings and assassinations. Iran responded by aiding the Taliban.
The view here has been that better ties with Iran would have provided a more reliable supply route than ones through Russia and Pakistan. Another opportunity was lost by our foreign policy hands.
These developments should have brought caution and even reevaluation in Washington. They did not. Year after year, administration after administration, the war dragged on. No one in government wanted to say the effort had failed and defeat was coming. That would have lost votes, showed a lack of teamwork, and endangered promotions and pensions.
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The end of conscription has diminished public engagement with war. Military service for most is family lore from aging parents and casualties are of little immediate, personal concern. War is in the hands of political, military, and intelligence elites whose contribution to our security is becoming increasingly dubious. Their flailing in Central Asia is coming to an embarrassing end.
© 2021 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.