Where’s the Taliban offensive?
Brian M Downing
The Taliban offensive of last year was remarkably strong. They struck in the east, south, and the north where they seized the provincial capital of Kunduz and held it for several days. Special forces units, which are about the only effective fighters in the Afghan National Army, were stretched thin. American and British special forces had to be send in. Had the Taliban struck in the three regions in a coordinated matter, they might have been more successful.
The 2016 fighting season came with the spring. The Taliban were expected to launch a simultaneous multi-prong offensive and again overstretch ANA special forces, perhaps even breaking some of them. This would lead to the loss of more territory and give the insurgents, at the very least, a strong position in negotiations.
The fighting season will continue for four months or so, but thus far the Taliban have not been as successful as feared. Not long ago, the capital of Helmand province seemed about to fall. It hasn’t. Powerful coordinated offensives in the north and east were expected. Fighting has picked up, but no major effort has occurred yet.
Puzzling.
Improvements in the ANA?
The paucity of Taliban success could be due to marked improvement in the regular forces of the Afghan military. Many regular troops performed rather poorly last year, most notably in the north where they gave up Kunduz city without much of a fight. It’s possible that better training and professionalization of the officer corps have reaped impressive results. This is improbable as improvement would be more likely to follow actual combat success, not training exercises, and the officer corps is as venal as ever.
Nor can the present situation be attributed to expanded combat deployments of American and British special forces. Their airmobility and proven effectiveness could indeed blunt Taliban drives before they reach their objectives. While western units operated in that manner late last year, they have not done so yet in this fighting season.
Greater coordination between ANA ground units and western air support is a more likely factor. (It is likely behind the success of the Iraqi army at Ramadi, Fallujah, and the approaches to Mosul.) ISIL positions are identified then swiftly reduced. Similarly, Taliban troops concentrations can be identified and western air support called in.
Internal divisions in the Taliban
Even while in power the Taliban was divided over the issue of internationalism. One wing held that the movement should concentrate on governing Afghanistan through Islamist principles. Another thought it was necessary to become part of an international movement. The death of Mullah Omar and accession of new leaders brought statements of solidarity with international movements such as ISIL.
The Taliban, however, is not a monolithic organization. It’s barely an organization at all. It cannot impose its beliefs on local commanders and their fighters, most of whom are local powerholders and tribal levies with little knowledge of, or interest in, the world outside their district. ISIL’s lofty vision of a restored caliphate is less important than expelling Kabul officials and their foreign backers. The former promises many more years of war; the latter is more manageable.
The shuras in Pakistan might no longer command many district levies. A large-scale coordinated offensive might be beyond the shuras‘ capabilities, whether they know it now or not.
Logistics
As they seek to conquer districts and whole provinces, the Taliban are fighting in larger groups – something they could not dare while western troops were present in numbers. This, as every sizable army knows or learned to its sorrow, requires sound logistics. Weapons, ammunition, medical equipment, communication gear, and some food must be brought from rear areas up to the units massed for campaigns. Heretofore, the Taliban has fought only in small units against western patrols, ANA outposts, and going back to the period after the Russians departed, against small mujahideen bands.
The Taliban may be incapable of supplying large forces, let alone in two or more parts of the country. They have little in the way of mechanized transport and the roads are patrolled on the ground and from the skies. (A comparison might be to the N Vietnamese forces in the 1972 Offensive in which Hanoi was unable to supply the large units it directed across the DMZ, in the Central Highlands, and on the approaches to Saigon.)
Pakistan
The Taliban have long enjoyed support from at least some officers in Pakistan’s army and intelligence service. The Taliban are the common enemy of India and they have affinities with the national-religious ideology the army encourages. Support may be dwindling.
The generals face increased pressure from China and the US to help bring peace to Afghanistan. More importantly, the Taliban’s turn toward internationalism and alignment with ISIL offer the prospect of unity of purpose with the Pakistani Taliban and the loss of the Pashtun region of the northwest. The generals’ effort to strengthen the country are contributing to its further disintegration.
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As it stands, the 2016 fighting season has seen only a return to a slow war of attrition. ANA casualties have been high, but no reliable information on Taliban losses are available. While it’s possible that attrition alone will break the ANA, it’s just as possible that the quantitatively superior ANA will wear down its enemy
Copyright 2016 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.