Brian M Downing
Candidate Trump made it clear that he opposed the Iran nuclear treaty, or JCPOA, and would be much firmer with Iran than President Obama had been or a President Hillary Clinton would be. President Trump has solidified ties with the Israeli Right and Sunni princes, making tough action by the “Triple Entente” against the Islamic Republic a certainty.
Where will Iran be hit, literally and figuratively? And just what sort of change does Washington, Jerusalem, and Riyadh want to bring to Iran? The end game might not be as uplifting as the neoconservatives’ rhetoric of freedom and democracy. They might prefer to see Iran go the way of Libya and Iraq.
Points of attack
The Entente has several ways of imposing costs on Iran. First, the Islamic Republic has patched together militias drawn from the Shias of Afghanistan and several other countries and sent them into the Syrian civil war. This is in addition to Hisbollah units and the 2,000 IRGC troops engaged there. Israel has already struck these units and the effort is likely to increase, possibly with US participation. The Entente will strengthen the hold of SDF troops in northeastern and eastern Syria, thereby blocking communication lines between Iran and Syria. Shia countries may continue to lose men and money many more years.
Second, operations will likely be conducted inside Iran. In recent years Mossad and the MeK have assassinated scientists involved in the country’s nuclear program. They may branch out to politicians and generals, or continue with scientists if Iran restarts its enrichment program as it has warned in recent days. Should enrichment proceed, the centrifuges at Natanz and Fordo may be bombed.
Third, the Iranian economy will continue to be targeted. Growth is low and inflation high – about 9 percent. US sanctions remain essentially in place and the Entente will press other countries to limit trade with the Islamic Republic. Paradoxically, Saudi Arabia and Iran, along with other oil exporters, have cooperated to limit production, raising prices off the lows of $31/bbl two years ago up to $73/bbl now. This presents American producers, now allowed to export oil, to gain markets abroad. Washington will seek to win contracts at Iran’s expense. If successful, the Iran will suffer badly.
Diplomacy
Saudi Arabia and its Sunni allies will also seek to gain market share at Iran’s expense. Their efforts and those of the US will use diplomacy. American oil producers will rely mainly on prices, the Sunnis will use trade incentives. Sunni diplomacy might be brought to bear on Russia, the Islamic Republic’s backer-in-chief. They will offer Moscow continued cooperation on output quotas and perhaps more importantly, sizable arms purchases. In return, Russia will be expected to slacken economic, military, and diplomatic support to Iran.
China can be asked to reduce trade with Iran in exchange for oil contracts at favorable prices and arms purchases. Neither Moscow nor Beijing is likely to break completely with Tehran, but reduced ties would further weaken Iran’s economy, increase its isolation, and give Saudi Arabia ascendance in the Gulf.
Saudi Arabia and Israel will press the US to reduce sanctions on Russia as part of the deal. One could tentatively assemble the sketchy information on Russian contacts with the Trump circle in a manner that suggest this is already underway.
The end game
At the very least, the Entente wants to force Iran to abandon or greatly reduce aid to Hisbollah and withdraw from Syria, leaving the country too weak and fragmented to figure in regional politics again, except as victim. This would be a formidable achievement, however Iran feels besieged, with good reason, and is unlikely to abandon allies. The Entente, in any event, probably wants more.
Continued losses of money and troops in Syria over the course of a few years, perhaps less, could combine with a stagnant or worsening economy to reignite the protests that swept across Iran last winter. Another round might be more problematic for the generals and mullahs who are unlikely to accede to popular demands for reform.
The generals and mullahs see democracy as leading to social decay, party infighting, demands for regional autonomy, and state paralysis – all at a time of grave international danger. They are more likely to brush aside existing semi-democratic institutions such as the elected presidency, various political parties, and the consultative legislature.
The Entente would not be troubled by jarring turmoil and the dismantling of democratic institutions. Such moves would bring protracted trouble for the regime and limit its ability to act on the world stage. Paralysis and breakdown would be as welcome as freedom and democracy, if not more so.
Copyright 2018 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks to Susan Ganosellis.