Brian M Downing
President Trump has signaled displeasure with the absence of progress in the Afghanistan war. Only a year ago he dismissed his instincts to get out of the landlocked country and instead opted to send in more troops. Some NATO allies have already done so.
Whether the president’s displeasure will soon pass is unclear. Few if any generals will openly admit the war is unwinnable. For several years the objective has been to wear down the Taliban and get them to negotiate. Longstanding goals of a stable central government and vibrant economy seemed doable in the heady days after 9/11 when confidence in strategic thinking was infused with faith in American might and underlying vengefulness.
Next year, young Americans born after the 9/11 attacks will join the military. Some will be ordered to Afghanistan. The president has few attractive options.
The situation
Over the last few years the Taliban have tried to seize and hold one or more provincial capitals, notably Kunduz in the north and Lashkar Gah in the south. The effort requires massing troops which are then vulnerable to US airpower. The number of airstrikes has been soaring since 2016. Taliban casualties have likely been quite high but reliable statistics are unavailable.
The Taliban have abandoned the campaign for major cities, at least for now, and concentrated on expanding their presence in rural districts, isolating adjacent cities, and further weakening Kabul. This has led to the idea in Washington and Kabul that small, remote outposts should be abandoned and troops should focus on cities.
The Kabul government and its local officials remain irremediably corrupt. Wars going back to the late 70s have killed off or undermined traditional local notables, leaving several layers of venal, grasping elders – “amoral tribalism”, as it’s been called here.
The Afghan army (ANA) has only a few effective units. The rest are led by incompetent appointees and wracked by ethnic hostilities and ghost soldiers. Unable to rely on logistical support or medical help, many combat units are poorly motivated. Small outposts are surrendering without a fight.
Special forces raids
One option is to use special forces to strike deep in Taliban-controlled areas. The insurgency has developed significantly since the early years of shadowy guerrilla bands along the frontier with Pakistan. They now have control of or substantial influence in about one-third of the country.
This means the Taliban have administrative presences – taxation and courts, training centers, and logistical hubs. These appendages of a mature insurgency enjoy relative security.
Western and ANA special forces could conduct intermittent, destructive raids deep into the insurgent heartland. Naturally, they would be supported by airpower. Taliban supplies and administrative presences would be interrupted. Troops would have to be reallocated from campaigns in other parts of the country.
Strategic outposts
A related and perhaps complementary approach is to build sizable base camps in the Taliban heartland. Western and ANA troops could conduct long-range patrols and direct artillery fire on supply and infiltration routes from Pakistan. Most importantly, the outposts could entice the Taliban into laying siege to them.
This of course would require reallocating resources from campaigns elsewhere and concentrating them near the enclaves. Local intelligence and drones would find attractive targets for US airstrikes.
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Special forces raids and strategic outposts and may coerce the Taliban into pulling back from promising campaigns elsewhere. However, they will also require the US, UK, and ANA to allocate their own troops away from contested districts and cities. Neither option can turn the tide, only push the enemy off balance and inflict higher casualties. Nor can either force the Taliban to negotiate in the near future.
Perhaps the president will look upon the 17-year war in a remote, landlocked country in business-like terms – his forte. The present effort holds no likelihood of success and augurs no grievous loss if abandoned. Business acumen might combine with impatience and rashness to the benefit of American priorities.
Copyright 2018 Brian M Downing
See also my “The failure of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan” (2009) and “Leaving Afghanistan – and turning the tables” (2017).
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks to Susan Ganosellis.