Brian M Downing
Saudi Arabia and Iran have been engaged in conflict since the Khomeini Revolution of 1979 and the Iran-Iraq War that began the following year. Washington may think it can limit involvement to supplying arms and intelligence with an occasional skirmish and airstrike. But the US risks deeper involvement and waning influence in the world.
Deployment of US troops
Early in the Kennedy administration, when the CIA was patching together the Bay of Pigs operation, Langley assured the Cuban invasion force that if need be the US would intervene. All the while, it was assuring the White House it would not be needed. They were, but Kennedy refused to send them in.
A few years later, the US was confident that S Vietnam could defeat the Viet Cong insurgency without US ground troops. The US sent in two divisions in 1965. Many more followed. Recently, NATO operations against Qaddafi’s army were supposed to be handled chiefly by European allies. Only a few weeks into the effort, the US had to take up the burden.
In recent weeks, Sunni troops have tried to expel the Shia Houthis from the port of Hodeida. Despite superiority in numbers, logistics, and airpower, the Sunni offensive has bogged down and the port remains under Houthi control. In the Saudi logic, this is clear evidence of substantial Iranian involvement – a red flag to Neocon bulls. The greater effectiveness of the Houthis barely enters the logic.
Surely, the same logic goes, greater American involvement will tilt the conflict to Riyadh’s benefit. The Saudis will naturally point out that US involvement would be small, decisive and above all brief.
As the conflict wears on, and as Sunni coffers drain and publics become more restive, the princes may face troubles, perhaps even jarring upheavals. They will insist the problem stems from Tehran and call upon the US for help.
Russian-Chinese opportunity
Protracted conflict will bring opportunities for Moscow and Beijing in the Gulf. In the event neither side is able to defeat or gravely weaken the other, both Tehran and Riyadh may face fiscal trouble and painful reappraisal. Both oil producers may be losing market shares as American exports continue to ramp up. The notion of an American-Zionist conspiracy will find receptive audiences in mosques, palaces, and streets.
The option of easing tensions and restoring a measure of comity, if only that of the 90s, may be appealing to Gulf states. Washington is hardly positioned to play the role of mediator. The US is despised by Iranian leaders and by a large and growing part of the public as well.
Moscow and Beijing, on the other hand, have good ties with both Gulf powers. Russia supplanted the US as Iran’s chief ally/arms supplier back in the 90s. And while friction developed between Saudi Arabia and Russia over Syria, Riyadh has returned to buying Russian arms, including the S-400 air defense system, which is also being sold to Iran. China buys copious amounts of oil from the Saudis and Iranians and remains aloof from the wars wracking the Islamic world.
The Gulf states may eventually see no point in continuing the wars and look for foreign states to mediate and maintain agreements. Russia and China will come to dominate the lucrative regional arms bazaar – at the expense of western countries – and manage security in the Gulf, as the US has generally done for decades.
European relations
American allies are concerned not only by President Trump’s overbearing demeanor, but also by his disregard for international norms and obligations. He has withdrawn from the Paris Agreement on climate and the JCPOA nuclear deal. NAFTA’s future is unclear. The president has been critical of NATO and puzzlingly solicitous toward the alliance’s longstanding adversary – Russia.
Greater turmoil in the Gulf will bring further dismay. Few European leaders share the White House’s view that Iran has violated the nuclear agreement. They can find support from Secretary of Defense Mattis and former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. Protracted turmoil in the Gulf will hike oil prices, shake world markets, and perhaps bring more terrorism to Europe.
Longstanding European allies see the Iran policy as based not on a careful assessment of US security interests but on pressure from Middle-Eastern countries with far less strategic value. They may also worry that the US has entered a period of internal confusion that’s bringing more uncertainty to its foreign policy.
Copyright 2018 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks to Susan Ganosellis.