Rumors of war between Russia and the Ukraine have become more insistent since beginning last fall. American intelligence believes fighting may break out any day. Talks are ongoing but Putin sees the US as weak, in decline, no longer able to act authoritatively. Nothing out of Washington in the last year contradicts that view. An alternative to war would be Moscow’s demand that Kiev cede the eastern Ukraine, and Kiev’s compliance. The demand may come soon, naturally accompanied by claims of wanting to defend imperiled ethnic Russians in the east – a Sudetenland of sorts. Failing that, war is likely.
Limited war
The view expressed here in early December was that Putin will not try to conquer and annex the Ukraine as he did the Crimea in 2013. He will try to expand and consolidate control of the eastern, Russian-speaking areas. He can then better protect military bases in the Crimea and strengthen lines of communication with his forces in the Middle East and Africa.
Trying to take other areas will meet with stiff resistance from Ukrainian troops that are better-armed and more resolute than the ones who meekly handed over the Crimea. Ukrainian civilians have been trained in irregular warfare and would dearly love to inflict casualties on Russian forces. Family lore going back to Stalin’s imposed starvation in the 30s demands it, as do Putin’s more recent actions. Furthermore, the deeper Russian forces drive, the harsher the EU response, perhaps including curtailment of Nord Stream 2. This limited war scenario seems to be the one Washington has adopted.
An addendum to the December scenario: Moscow may make a small number of shallow thrusts outside the eastern areas, preventing a concentrated response. Russian troops have begun exercises in Belarus whose southern border is about sixty miles from Kiev. An armored thrust from there could be accompanied by a warning that the east must be ceded, officially and promptly. The Russian contingent in Moldova is too small for a diversionary attack but it may announce itself.
Outcomes
The concern in Western capitals is substantial but it hasn’t reached the level of sending combat troops, and it never will. Deployments would trigger war, not deter it. The US, Britain, France, Canada, Spain, and the Baltic states have sent arms, trainers, or ships to show support. The recent inflow of antitank weapons and trainers must worry Russia as they devastated Russian armor in Syria – and Ukrainian soldiers are better trained than Syrian rebels.
The war could be costly, embarrassing, and consequential. Nonetheless, Putin wants the east and casualties and sanctions are acceptable to him. Western memories are short, Putin’s yen for prestige and vengeance is long.
Three possibilities:
First, the Russian offensive could stall in the face of spirited resistance. A stalemate and war of attrition could follow, something more intense than what’s been going on, something akin to the internecine fighting along the Suez Canal after the Six-Day War in 1967. This is unlikely even with Kiev’s resolute troops, antitank weaponry, and defensive advantages. Moscow has superior airpower and considerable reserves.
Second, Ukrainian leaders may draw Russian troops deeper into the homeland, perhaps by leaving gaps in the front or mocking Russia in official statements. Penetration will strengthen domestic resolve, make invading forces more vulnerable along their flanks, and allow partisan fighters to put their training to good use. World opinion will be more hostile toward Moscow. This outcome too is unlikely but high casualties can lead to decisions based on passion rather than calculus.
Third, Russia may successfully take the east but Ukrainian forces will continue the fight with guerrilla raids behind the lines in the east and into Moldova to the west, possibly with Islamic groups from the Crimea and Syria. This will prevent the east from developing and integrating with the Russian economy. The primary mission of US Green Berets in the 50s was to train guerrilla forces and serve with them in the event Soviet troops overran parts of Europe. They are reprising that role now in the Ukraine. Russian retaliation would be fearsome, as would airstrikes in the Ukraine.
The outcome is likely to be a reasonably quick win for Moscow. The costs and risks appear manageable. The desire to further weaken American credibility is compelling.
©2022 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.