American support for the Ukraine war

Brian M Downing 

Russia and China now see the war isn’t ending soon but feel time is on their side. They believe democracies are deeply flawed and no longer have the will and martial spirit of modern authoritarian governments, especially those in Moscow and Beijing where dissent and diversity aren’t seen as strengths but as threats. Putin and Xi note signs of flagging support for Ukraine in European countries and they expect to see it in the US as well. Americans after all no longer have the martial people they had after 1865 and 1945. 

Once Americans see the war as too costly, unimportant to their lifestyles, and the misguided policy of incumbents, aid will decline. Western Europe will follow suit, Ukraine will fall, and most of the world will have to recognize the new order.

American political, military, and security elites support the war. Their positions are based on assessment of strategic dynamics. Their support is unlikely to waiver. It’s the public that Russia and China are watching – and trying to influence.

An AP-NORC poll conducted in February of this year found 48% of respondents support military aid to Ukraine, 29% oppose it, and 22% holding neither view. Last May, 60% supported military aid. The 20% decline is substantial. Given the enormity of Russian conduct, these numbers aren’t impressive. They are worrisome.

Support is neither broad nor deep. Most people enjoy clever memes, quick stories of hearty soldiers, and leave it at that – without coming to grips with the implications of the war. There’s been no uptick in military service. The Pentagon has had to relax recruitment standards. However, a hundred or so Americans have volunteered to fight in international units on the steppes. 

Support may erode as people come to understand the war as begun by the military-industrial complex (American, not Russian), or unwisely engaged in by the incumbent party, or a misallocation of money better spent at home, or as a conflict likely to escalate, perhaps to include nuclear weapons. Those arguments already come from bumptious media celebrities, intemperate partisan politicians, and academics closer attuned to their models than to European history. They’ve not done great damage yet but they persevere.

The importance of the Russian war on Ukraine for democracies, global trade, and national autonomy doesn’t register in postmodern America. Leaders, schools, and media make little effort to get that across. Life is more centered on hyper-individualism and consumerism than it was at the outset of previous wars. Knowledge of history and geography have receded before the majestic self and the blinding present. The attraction of war was once incandescent, often tragically so, but it’s been dimmed by Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

Erosion of support is worrisome but unlikely to reach critical levels. American soldiers aren’t being killed and maimed and deficits are incomprehensible abstractions. Public indifference, though regrettable and exasperating, means no significant expectations or potential disappointments – or demands for reappraisal and disengagement. Paradoxically, but importantly for a postmodern country in a dangerous world, indifference is a strategic asset of sorts – as Moscow and Russia will realize.

©2023 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.