Brian M Downing
Putin’s war on Ukraine shows no sign of relenting. The Donbas campaign has brought only limited gains at great cost and even they are being lost to counterattacks. The war is moving toward stalemate. Artillery exchanges might soon predominate.
The entire world is affected. With less Russian oil on the market and uncertainty everywhere, benchmark prices have risen. Ukrainian ports are blockaded, so the cost of food is up. Inflation, a concern before the war, is up even more and central banks are raising rates. Approval ratings are down, civil unrest is up, governments may fall.
China has interests around the world and ambitions of becoming the most powerful country in the world. Putin’s miscalculation is causing mounting problems for those ambitions.
The long shadow
Though not engaged in the war, and less supportive of it than Putin hoped, China nonetheless faces criticism and even condemnation. Its chief ally is responsible for a war of aggression, thousands of civilian deaths, large-scale atrocities, and a pitiless blockade of food exports.
China’s support for harsh rule in many corners of the world and subjugation of Hong Kong resonate with ongoing events. The destruction of Ukraine’s culture and the deportation of its people from their homeland echoes policies toward the Uighur. And China’s military has well-known designs on Taiwan.
The threat of instability
Rising prices cause trouble for China, domestically and internationally. It imports a great deal of food for an immense and increasingly urban population. Turmoil is unlikely as the state has a vast reservoir of support based on rapid economic growth and thrilling strides toward national greatness.
Unrest poses a greater problem in China’s co-prosperity sphere. Iran, an important oil exporter to China, is experiencing urban rioting. It’s unlikely to ease, especially as China is shifting oil purchases to a struggling Russia. Law and order is breaking down in Sri Lanka. Food distribution problems will worsen in Afghanistan which has growing ethnic and Islamist insurgencies and a small border with China’s Muslim Xinjiang province.
Political and ethnic fighting will deepen in Myanmar. Anti-Chinese sentiment is already prominent in Zambia and Pakistan, especially in the latter’s restive Baloch region where separatists routinely attack Chinese interests. Simmering Islamist movements in Central Asia, where Chinese firms are ascendant, will have greater appeal.
The dubious partner
China, facing determined and well-armed states in East and Southeast Asia, very much needs a militarily strong, expansive ally. Only Russia can project power across most of the Eurasian landmass. But the Ukraine war has exposed Russia’s limitations.
Russia is a major source of China’s oil, gas, metals, and timber. Rail lines, roads, and pipelines connect the two states. The trans-Ural region is a Chinese development zone. Beijing’s hopes of using Russia as a way station in land commerce with the EU is in doubt. Who will buy products transported over Russian roads and railways, regardless of the country of origin?
China prefers to limit its foreign military footprint. Russian soldiers and mercenaries support governments in Africa, Asia, and South America that provide oil, copper, iron, and rare earths to Chinese industry. Russia maintains military forces in Central Asian countries where Chinese investments pervade and Islamist bands grow. The presence of Uighur militants in that part of the world will make Russian troops all the more needed.
National security bureaus plan ahead, or try to. They consider various scenarios and often glom on to the most dire one. China’s bureaus are dismayed by Russia’s performance in Ukraine. Their partner has been revealed to be an inept braggart whose miscalculations are pushing it toward military and economic ruin.Political turmoil may not be far off.
What if, Beijing’s bureaus may ponder, Putin’s control slips from his increasingly frail hands? Beijing may have to make the portentous decision of sending its own troops to several parts of the world in order to prop up governments, suppress unrest, and secure assets.
What if a new regime in Moscow is cooler toward the East and conciliatory toward the West, perhaps due to incentives of sanctions relief? Adroit diplomacy in Moscow could prevent that dire scenario from coming about and endangering China’s return to greatness.
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Xi and Putin have tremendous ambitions, ruthlessness, and senses of destiny. However, Xi is more patient and far more knowledgeable of his enemies’s abilities than his partner is. He’s also the senior partner and this must be impressed upon the weakening one.
Though it avoids interfering in the affairs of states with obliging rulers, China has compelling economic and geopolitical interests at stake. It would be a significant step toward global respect if it were to use its clout to move toward a solution, by either changing Putin’s mind or Russia’s leadership.
Next: China’s allies in Moscow
©2022 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.