Brian M Downing
Putin’s war on Ukraine is in its ninth month. Offensives in the north and east have failed. His army has lost the initiative and cannot regain it in the foreseeable future, probably not for years. Casualties have been staggering, supply systems are unreliable, and poorly trained and equipped replacements are liabilities to worn-down BTGs.
The war has shifted to the south. A battle for the west bank of the Dnipro looms. However, Ukraine feinted there months ago, then struck in the north near Kharkiv – with excellent results. Another bluff may be on and Ukraine may attack well east of the river.
The Dnipro
Early in the war, Russian troops struck north from Crimean bases and drove east to Melitopol and west to Kherson. It was their most successful effort. Both cities remain in Russian hands, both may figure highly in coming weeks or months. Most would say Kherson more than Melitopol.
Russia has a large presence west of the Dnipro, perhaps 25,000 troops. Supplying them has become difficult as the bridges have been damaged and routes to and from Crimean bases are harried by partisans. Spirited partisan attacks have also been underway for months inside Kherson city and more recently inside Melitopol to the east.
Russian positions west of the Dnipro buckled months ago. A collapse like the one east of Kharkiv seemed imminent. Ukraine opted to neither press hard against a demoralized enemy nor completely destroy the Dnipro bridges. Russia is busily reinforcing both sides of the Dnipro. It believes it can hold the line west of the river or at least stop the Ukrainians from crossing it and threatening Crimea. That’s where the war seems to be centered.
Misdirection?
The Ukrainians may be presenting another feint similar to the one that set up their Kharkiv offensive. Russia’s concentration on the Dnipro and Kherson entails shifting troops and materiel from other areas. No army can defend everything, perhaps least of all Russia’s. That presents vulnerabilities.
One vulnerability may be 300 kms northeast of Kherson near Zaporizhzhia and Melitopol. Zaporizhzhia has held off Russian troops since February, though its nuclear power plant was taken, and it could be the starting point for an offensive driving south to the road hub at Melitopol – a distance of only 60 kms.
If Ukrainian forces liberate or even get near Melitopol, Russian forces in the south would be cut in two and the Crimean peninsula, including Sebastopol, would be vulnerable. Moscow would have no choice but to reinforce Melitopol by withdrawing precipitously from other areas.
Russia would be forced into a major and perhaps decisive battle around Melitopol. The Ukrainians have superior training, weaponry, discipline, and morale. They also have interior lines of communication while Russian forces rely on an incompetent logistical system stretched over long distances. Partisan forces are increasingly active along supply routes.
Moscow will demand that the area north of the Crimea be held. Counterattacks will be ordered. At this point morale and discipline may be so low as to make them impossible and ruinous. Ukraine is positioned to destroy Russian supply lines along the Dnipro and across the Kerch Strait connecting Crimea to Russia. Tens of thousands of Russians could be isolated and annihilated.
Recriminations and purges are already enervating the army from the frontlines to Moscow. Collapse may not be far off. More figures in the army and state will realize that the war is lost and Putin’s orders to continue it will bring disaster.
©2022 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.