Iran under the gun 

Brian M Downing 

Over the weekend drones attacked military and industrial targets inside Iran. The drones were small with limited range and launched from either inside Iran or nearby Kurdish Iraq. Iranian assets in Syria were also struck. Israel is almost certainly involved. The new Netanyahu government loathes Iran and its Syrian and Hisbollah allies.      

This of course isn’t the first time Israel has struck inside Iran. Mossad has for years attacked personnel and sites related to Iran’s nuclear program and also IRGC and Hisbollah targets in Syria. Iran will respond in kind, probably against Saudi oil and chemical sites. Repression at home may intensify but so might internal turmoil. A protracted campaign may be underway.

The attackers

Netanyahu wasted no time since returning to power. Hawkish stances toward Iran have long been important for maintaining popular support and keeping Sunni states focused on Iran, not Israel or Palestine. Israel and the Sunnis see Iran as an emerging nuclear threat, a beacon to restive Shia populations, and the sole regional backer of Syria – a mostly Sunni nation governed if barely by an Alawi-Shia minority. 

Over the years Mossad has used the MeK to conduct most of the attacks and last weekend’s strikes was probably their work as well. Sunni princes finance the attacks. As a Saudi notable once admitted, his government isn’t very good at covert operations but it’s good at writing checks.

The US has probably not taken part in previous operations inside Iran, though three years ago a US drone killed IRGC general Soleimani in Baghdad. Now that Iran’s nuclear program is nearing weapon production and Russia is using Iranian drones to devastate Ukrainian cities, even a liberal president may support hitting Iran.

Tehran’s harsh repression of protests may well have turned thousands of  young idealists into disillusioned militants, willing albeit reluctantly to work with foreign powers to bring a new government.

The objectives  

The strikes on Iranian targets in the region will likely continue and possibly intensify. There are several objectives, though not every foreign power wants all of them. 

Detaching Syria from Iran  This will push Damascus toward the Sunni powers for reconstruction aid. Hisbollah will wither on the vine and Israel’s north will be more secure. (Similarly, Iran won’t be able to aid the Houthis in Yemen – a thorn in MBS’s side.)

Terminating the nuclear program  Iran was in compliance with the JCPOA until the US walked away from it in 2018. It has since then accelerated uranium enrichment. Strikes inside Iran my escalate and point to attacks on Fordo and Natanz which would require exceptional special forces operations or US aircraft and bombs.

Ending arms transfers to Russia  Iranian is shipping drones to Russia and deploying technical advisors to support them. The drones have been inflicting fearsome damage on civilian targets.

Weakening the state  Losing Syria, where thousands of Iranians have died, will saddle the mullahs and generals with the stigma of defeat. They have long legitimized themselves not only by invoking religion but also by presenting themselves as guardians of the nation in dangerous times. The glow of victory from the Iraq war (1980-88) has been waning for years and many younger people see their rulers as antiquated, corrupt, and increasingly murderous. Foreign weapons may be coming to Kurds, Balochs, and disaffected urban-dwellers. 

Forcing regime change  Some external powers want to bring down the mullahs and generals. This is the boldest aim, probably the most difficult one, and possibly the riskiest. A combination of defeats, urban insurrections, separatist revolts, and fiscal crises could bring, not transition and comity but paralysis and fragmentation. This would lead to Sunni dominance in the Gulf, which would be welcome in Saudi Arabia but not everywhere. 

The view here has long been that Israel benefited, from its inception to well into Khomeini era, from partnership with Iran against menacing Sunni states. The partnership is gone, in part due to Israeli trust in Sunni leaders. Iranian collapse would be a short-lived triumph. Israel would face a ruthless Saudi prince emboldened by victory and eager to restore Arab greatness. He has strategically hidden his hostility to Israel.

©2023 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.