Brian M Downing
Uncertainties of war
Churchill noted that wars never proceed as expected. He would know. The Chinese war party in the politburo and general staff might well think hard about his warning. They are inexperienced with actual war and prone to overconfidence and optimistic scenarios. Perhaps they’ve read Clausewitz on unpredictability and chance.
Regional adversaries
Over the last twenty years, China has been belligerent along its periphery. It’s claimed islands and waters that were either in dispute or judged owned by other countries. It’s built artificial islands and placed radar posts, missile systems, and airstrips on them. Chinese vessels menace and sometimes bump those of regional powers. Their planes violate neighbors’ airspace routinely.
China is increasingly seen less as a vital trade partner and more as a threat to the global economy. Japan, S Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia, Australia and to an uncertain extent the Philippines are on guard. Defense budgets and joint military exercises are up. China is ringed by concerned, potentially hostile powers, some of which have excellent militaries.
If those powers acted in concert, as they might in the face of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, they could harass and interdict Chinese shipping along the periphery. Add in a concerned India, and China could face a deeper threat to commerce and military probes in its Himalayan region. In the event of imminent hostilities over Taiwan, some states might deploy forces to their beleaguered ally.
Combat experience
China has a large, well-trained, and well-equipped military. But it has no combat experience save for border skirmishes in remote, ice-bound areas on the Indian border. The PLA’s last major conflict was the Korean War. It drove back S Korean, US, and UN forces from the Yalu and achieved a tactical victory, but that was long ago. There was the 1979 incursion into Vietnam. China achieved little but suffered tens of thousands of casualties in less than a month. There was no tactical victory. The PLA has held hundreds of exercises since then but they’re no substitute for combat.
The generals of authoritarian governments are promoted on the basis of political connections and loyalties, not on professional accomplishments. This calls into question the PLA’s competence and even the ability of its army, navy, and air force components to cooperate effectively in battle. Rivalrous factions compete for favor and hide problems.
The Japanese navy did not inform the army or state of its carrier losses at Midway in 1942 until three years later, when the home island were ringed by Nimitz and Halsey and invasion loomed. In the Six-Day War (1967) the Egyptian air force hid early losses. When the army learned of them, a panicked withdrawal from Sinai ensued.
The battle
The Taiwanese army is sizable, well-trained, and well-equipped but has no more combat experience than the PLA. Its last war was in the early years of the Vietnam War. The Taiwanese military has a relatively uncomplicated mission of defending an already heavily-fortified island with a supportive, determined population.
The PLA has to mobilize troops on the mainland, board them onto ships, transport them across contested waters, and land them in the face of hostile fire. Then it has to supply hundreds of thousands of troops by sea and provide naval and air supremacy – for several months. A tall order.
During WW2, the US moved quickly from island group to island group – the Solomons, the Gilberts, the Marshalls, the Philippines, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. The navy insisted on quick ground operations that limited their exposure to Japanese air and naval forces. That wasn’t possible at Okinawa, which was relatively large (880 sq miles) compared to, say, Tarawa or Saipan, but much smaller than Taiwan (14,000 sq miles). Little wonder the US bypassed it. The force dispatched to Okinawa comprised hundreds of ships and half a million troops. The battle took three months. Thirty-six US ships were sunk, another 368 badly damaged, 763 aircraft were lost, and almost 5,000 sailors were killed.
The campaign for Taiwan would take more than three months. Taiwan is 15-times the area of Okinawa and its military (active and reserve) is 20-times the size of the Japanese garrison. The most optimistic PLA casualty estimates must be formidable. The Beijing commanders may look upon the battle for Taiwan as American counterparts looked upon the invasions of Kyushu and Honshu in 1945, though presumably without a nuclear option.
The US
The US is indeed polarized and violent. The country has not known such turmoil since the mid-19th century. That does not mean that the US will be unable to act in the world. The command and control system is intact, powerful naval and air assets are at the ready, and more can be deployed on short notice. The US retains an important technological edge. Chinese students have learned well in American schools but they are not the leading edge.
American naval and air power can contribute to the defense of Taiwan, especially on the PLA’s effort to control supply lines to the island and assert air superiority over it. Alone or in conjunction with East and Southeast Asian allies, the US navy can menace or interdict Chinese shipping all along the periphery and halt Chinese oil supplies from the Persian Gulf at the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca. Those choke points are far away from any place a PLA battle group would want to sally.
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The war party in Beijing must also ponder an array of US responses to the imminent loss of Taiwan or to the sinking of one of its aircraft carriers, which hasn’t happened since WW2. The response of a strife-torn, declining power, driven by popular outrage, might be fearsome. On the other hand, the war party might ponder its own response to a humiliating defeat that would devastate its economy and prestige and set back the march to global hegemony for a decade or more. Perhaps they’ve read Clausewitz on blind hate amid war.
© 2020 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.