Brian M Downing
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 portended favorably for world peace, at least to some. Others saw the source of Russian-Soviet actions based not in communist ideology but rather in a national security ideology and string of ambitious rulers, both of which predate Marx and Stalin.
The present ruler has confirmed this interpretation. Putin has reconstituted both army and state. A second Cold War was augured with the 2008 occupation of Georgia and made clear with the invasion of the Crimea and eastern Ukraine five years later.
The new administration is maneuvering to end or at least ease Cold War II. What’s behind this? How desirable is it? And most importantly, what’s the deal?
Detente II?
Candidate Trump’s talk of better relations with Russia, while not unwelcome, was puzzling. Investigations are revealing a slew of meetings and relationships between Trump’s retinue and Russian business and political leaders. A fuller understanding may come soon.
President Trump last week recommended bringing Russia back into the G7 community. This comes only a few years after the US urged expulsion, tough sanctions, and more military spending from NATO partners. The G7 meeting was at times so fractious that the president seemed determined to alienate Europe and shift economic and strategic focus elsewhere.
However, the administration has not gone entirely easily on Russia, as sometimes claimed. US airstrikes, operating under rules of engagement shaped in Washington, devastated a Russian probe in eastern Syria, resulting in the deaths of over a hundred Russian mercenaries. Moscow was uncharacteristically silent. The US has also struck Russia’s ally Syria for using chemical weapons. Again Moscow held back. Sanctions have hit Russian outfits involved in cyberwarfare. New ones were imposed Monday morning. Nonetheless, the administration is seeking more cordial ties with Russia.
Conflicting interests in Washington
Policy toward Moscow has been oppositional since the end of WW2, with only a short hiatus between the end of the USSR and the rise of Putin. Trump is eager to change that despite strong opposition to Russia in Congress, national security bureaus, the public, and most think tanks. Explanations for the shift range from blackmail to business dealings to a major foreign policy change.
Business dealings, extensive though they may be, could have provided a basis for dialogue but the driving force behind Detente II is the neoconservatives, who want Iran gravely weakened. They’ve been on the policy sidelines since Barack Obama became president in 2009 but they’re now calling plays once again, despite losses in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The goal: Iran must quit Syria and its government must come down. The deal: the US eases sanctions on Russia and Putin reduces support for Iran.
The consequences
But how good’s the deal? Changes in foreign policy, even jarring ones, can be good – or at least seem to be. Nixon’s opening to China comes to mind. Cold War dynamics shifted and trade flourished. How would Detente II affect American interests?
Russia will come away with reduced sanctions and more revenue for state and army. Putin will see the US as less critical of aggression and human rights abuse, perhaps with good reason.
The world already faces a powerful alignment between Moscow and Beijing which will be all the stronger. If there is an aspect of Detente II that drives a wedge between Russia and China, it should be made clear, through word or gesture. In any case, Putin’s word means little.
Regime change in Iran sounds appealing, especially if the prospect of democracy is in the pitch. The rule of mullahs and generals is oppressive and in many respects archaic. Destabilizing it, however, might prove as conducive to stability and democracy as were the ousters of the Taliban, Saddam Hussein, and Col Qaddafi. Iran could descend into protracted turmoil and disintegration along ethnic lines. The region could then see more instability and larger havens for ISIL, AQ, and the like.
Detente II would further distance the US from longstanding partners in Europe with which it has had important economic, cultural, and military ties. Some date back to the nineteenth century, others to the end of World War Two. Europe is already dismayed by Washington’s clumsy rhetoric, criticism of soft defense budgets, and threats of trade war. Closer ties between Moscow and Washington will have European allies wondering about the reliability and judgment of so powerful an ally. Eastern European countries will question their security and fear that Washington sees them as London saw Czechoslovakia in 1938 – part of a deal.
Copyright 2018 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks to Susan Ganosellis.