Brian M Downing
While attention has focused on civil war and jihadism in the Middle East, Islamist militants have been striking in Mali, Chad, Burkina Faso, and Niger. The attacks are becoming bolder and more lethal. Government forces are not up to the task of taking them on. Indeed, outposts are being hit hard and the losses are high. Eighty-nine soldiers were killed in Niger last month – remarkable and ominous given the troops’ equipment, training, and defensive positions.
The governments may have to abandon more territory to militants and concentrate on cities. All this takes place despite the presence of French and American special forces who train, advise, and operate drones. Advisors can train soldiers to shoot, march, and salute, but there’s far more to being an effective army. That’s been made clear since Vietnam.
France is calling for more foreign assistance, the Pentagon is pondering a pullback. Something is happening in the Sahel and it doesn’t look good.
Roots of conflict
Like many parts of the world, Sahel countries are experiencing large population growth. In Niger, 70% of the population is under 24. In Chad, the figure is 57%. It’s 64% in Burkina Faso and 67% in Mali. Demand is on the rise for scarce resources such as water, arable land, and food. Tempers are flaring.
Resource problems are made more complicated and volatile by the presence of various large ethnic groups competing for those resources. Niger, Chad, and Burkina Faso have five sizable ethnic groups. Mali has seven. And of course many smaller, marginalized ethnic groups are also competing.
Regional governments might be expected to remedy problems but most are dominated by one or two ethnic groups. They have built up ideologies that shape their conceptions of fair distribution and minority complaints.
Following the collapse of Qaddafi’s government in 2011, Islamist groups thrived in several cities on the coast. More importantly, Qaddafi’s army had thousands of sub-Saharan mercenaries who fled south, as did stores of weapons.
The appeal of jihad
ISIL, AQ, and the like tap into long-standing war myths that pervade most cultures and resonate with young men. The youth of the Sahel have heard legends of great warriors, many of them relatives or tribal leaders, who put up fierce resistance to colonial powers and antagonistic peoples.
The Koran is a large repository of stories praising mighty armies which with divine guidance spread the faith and wreaked vengeance on the faithless.
The myths have been energized by ISIL’s sudden rise. Though its territory has been reduced to a few villages in the Levant, young men believe that it shook the region and still promises a new day of honor and glory. ISIL was only pushed back by foreign powers – further evidence that regional leaders lack both competence and legitimacy. The historic struggle goes on.
There’s nothing heroic or inspiring about the leaders in the Sahel. Decades ago, some could wrap themselves in the mantle of military honor after expelling colonial powers. Today, however, they are meretricious powerholders who work closely with foreign states on business and increasingly on security as well.
Not all who fight alongside Islamist fighters share the Islamist beliefs and aspirations. ISIL and AQ are able to make common cause with peoples hostile to dominant elites. This is the case in Egypt where disaffected bedouins of Sinai work with ISIL and AQ believers and on South Yemen where Sunni tribes have long disliked central power. There’s no shortage of similar people in the Sahel.
© 2020 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.