Brian M Downing
The most recent act of terrorism stemming from Saudi Arabia took place last week when a Saudi trainee killed three American military personnel in Florida. Over the years Saudis have propagated an anti-Western ideology across the Islamic world, bombed our embassies, attacked our naval vessel, executed the 9/11 attacks, and served in al Qaeda and ISIL.
The Florida attack underscores Saudi Arabia’s connection to world terrorism. It also raises the question of the presence of violent Islamist sentiment inside the its armed forces. There are other problems inside the military and combined they might cause great trouble for the kingdom.
Islamist militancy
Wahhabism is the ideological foundation of the kingdom and its hostility to the West is taught in schools and mosques. The US found the creed useful in marshaling money and fighters against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, but afterwards mujahideen fighters returned home and spread appealing tales of the heroic ordeals, annealed faith, and fraternal solidarity that inspired a younger generation. Many heard the call to fight in Iraq and Syria. Others saw their rulers as decadent, incompetent, and increasingly cooperative with countries they once detested.
Population levels and social changes have risen sharply but opportunities for meaningful work and starting a family have not kept apace. Frustrations lead to apocalyptic sentiment that stress great days of vengeance just ahead and the importance of violent jihad in bringing about a new order.
Islamist militancy and political disaffection are widespread, especially in young men, and they make their way into the rank and file through the regular army’s conscription and the national guard’s tribal levies.
Professional resentment
Soldiers pride themselves on knowledge of weaponry, tactics, and strategy. That’s what separates them from the civilian world. Mastery of military technique should be the basis of promotion, especially into the ranks of division commanders and the general staff. The Saudi military promotes on the basis of kinship with and loyalty to the royal family – in part because of a patrimonial culture, in part because of a need to ensure loyalty and prevent coups. After all, how many Middle Eastern powerholders owe their positions to military coups?
Cronyism limits advancements for earnest officers from non-privileged backgrounds, and deepens their resentments as well. It almost certainly ensures inadequate battlefield performance as strategy, intelligence, communications, and logistics will suffer. Rather than preventing coups, a patrimonial promotion system has historically encouraged coups – ones led by reform-minded colonels such as Nasser and Qaddafi.
Triggers
Several things could turn disaffection into turmoil and revolt. Professionals see the crown’s reluctance to put troops into combat in Syria and Yemen as an insult to the rank and file and a sign of faithlessness in Riyadh. However, combat with even moderate casualties might bring disintegration to the army and instability to the regime.
Professionals and Islamists might agree on very little yet feel shame on seeing the ruling family – self-proclaimed defenders of the holy sites – rely on the West to take back ISIL’s caliphate straddling the Sykes-Picot line. Further, it is galling to see the royals align with Israel against a fellow Islamic country, albeit one that deviates from Sunnism.
Paradoxically, an institution designed to defend the royal family may become its greatest danger. A conjuncture of events could bring serious trouble from an audacious brigade commander stationed near Mecca, an outraged security detail in Riyadh, or a lone figure piloting a bomb-laden aircraft shortly after returning from training in the US.
© 2019 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.