Brian M Downing
The US has retaliated against IRGC personnel and proxies after three GI deaths on a small remote base near the Jordanian-Syrian border. Retaliatory trikes have gone on for several days now and aim at getting Iran to back down. There’s little sign of it.
Where is this going? One alternative is to hold fast to vulnerable positions in an inhospitable area, but that assures more casualties and presents problems with friendly states. Another is to withdraw the small force. That of course would be an embarrassment but it would bring advantages.
The situation
The principal mission of US troops in the region was to assist local forces drive back and extinguish ISIL forces which erupted into a dangerous force ten years ago. The mission came to include considerable air support and artillery units. ISIL was painstakingly driven from major cities such as Mosul and Raqqa.
Despite losing its offensive punch and most of its territory, ISIL remains in small towns and villages on both sides of the Syrian-Iraqi border. The US has seen the need to stay until ISIL is completely gone. That may never come as ISIL continues to draw support from disaffected youths and financiers in the Middle East. The Trump administration announced withdrawals on two occasions but backed down each time.
Logistics are difficult in the landlocked area and may become more so if Baghdad orders the US out of Iraq. Given the ire over US support for Israel’s Gaza campaign, word may not be far off. The US should privately welcome the order and even work behind the scenes to bring it about.
Disadvantages and advantages
Washington would off course be accused of abandoning commitments. This argument wouldn’t hold on the Iraqi side of the border. The army there is fairly well-trained and can contain ISIL. The situation is less clear on the Syrian side where US administrations have built an autonomous region based on rivalrous Kurdish and Arab militias. They can never form a viable government – not in Iraq, not in Syria. A US protectorate lasting decades is impractical.
The Kurds could come to an agreement with Damascus. At the beginning of the civil war Damascus offered the Kurds autonomy in exchange for support. The Kurds didn’t accept but they avoided fighting government troops and focused instead on Islamist bands such as al Nusrah and ISIL. They did well. Autonomy may still be on the table. Damascus wants proven fighters to counter remaining Islamist bands and growing Turkish threats.
Advantages will follow from withdrawal. Lacking the unifying effect of the American presence, militia commanders may prioritize seizing resources and expanding personal power – at the expense of effectiveness. ISIL may become emboldened but this would not pose a threat as it seeks to win territory not strike distant targets. Its energies will go against Damascus and its Russian backers situated on bases from the Mediterranean to the eastern desert. China’s growing commercial presence and support for faithless kings and generals will also attract ISIL’s attention.
Most importantly, our troops will be out of isolated vulnerable positions of little strategic value. Withdrawal will of course be politically difficult, especially in an election year. But leaving on our own is better than the humiliation of receiving an eviction notice from a government we made possible in 2003. The opposition in Washington will decry it as a sellout and overstate the ISIL peril. But domestic politics bogged us down in the remote expanses of the Levant. Sound strategic assessment is needed now.
©2024 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.