Notes on the proposed nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia

Brian M Downing 

Whistleblowers this week released information on the Trump administration’s keen interest in selling nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia. The deal was being pushed ahead without adequate scrutiny by Congress or the public – despite, or because of, considerable mistrust of Saudi Arabia. Congress and the public are more engaged now.

The Saudis, though one of the largest oil producers, want nuclear energy to light their expanding cities and run proposed industrial parks, allowing them to export more oil and gas. The same claims were made by Iran but were immediately met with skepticism in Washington and Jerusalem. 

Riyadh’s claims should be met the same way. After all, similar sales have been broached in the past but put aside when Riyadh rejected the strict safeguards. There are pros and cons to the deal, but the latter seem to outweigh the former.

The sale would bring petrodollars into the American economy – right along with the large sums going to defense industries. The benefits for employment are clear, not so much the consequences. Saudi Arabia buys American military hardware not to build a professional army, but to gain influence in the defense industry, Congress, and the White House. Today, that influence has pushed the country into supporting the Saudi side in conflicts with Yemen and Iran, neither related to US national security.

The sale would boost the prestige of Mohammad bin Salman both at home and abroad. His subjects would be impressed by ownership of modern technology and the promise it holds for the kingdom’s power in coming years. Saudi Arabia already leads a Sunni league. Its prestige would be all the brighter – and perhaps more appealing to states presently outside the league.

A nuclear deal would solidify the US-Saudi-Israeli alliance which seeks to reshape the Middle East by weakening Iran and its allies in Syria and Yemen. The wisdom of this enterprise, in the present or longterm, has never been thought through. 

A Saudi Arabia with nuclear technology would cause concern in Iran. Tehran would recall the dismay in the region and elsewhere when it embarked on nuclear research and wonder why the same opposition doesn’t follow a Saudi program. Iran may be goaded into restarting its weapons program which according to American intelligence was put on hold in 2003. Indeed, the proposed sale may be intended to do just that and offer up a reason to attack.

Mohammad bin Salman is a young, ambitious, and ruthless monarch. He is determined to see Iran weakened and his kingdom become the region’s unchallengeable hegemon. He may be using the proposed reactor deal as a stepping stone to enriching uranium or building a breeder reactor, each of which can make weapons-grade material. Presumably, there will be international inspections but states have been known to halt them and build weapons.

The security situation inside the kingdom is another source of concern. The security forces have not demonstrated professional competence, not even after the lengthy takeover of Mecca in 1979, which was ended only with the help of foreign troops. Dangerous materials, below weapons-grade, could fall into the wrong hands and be fashioned into a dirty bomb. 

The view here is that the present alliance between the US, Israel, and Saudi Arabia is myopic and unlikely to endure. A triumphant Saudi Arabia will almost certainly turn its attention to Israel. The king will want more and more power prestige. His subjects, and those of aligned countries, will want to avenge past defeats. Accordingly, why should the US want to advance Saudi power prestige? We may have to destroy it someday.

© 2019 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.