Optimism and delusion in the Kremlin

Brian M Downing

Putin’s war on Ukraine was supposed to be swift and victorious. He probably had a lavish victory celebration all arranged – one modeled on Stalin’s 1945 display. The war, however, is entering a third year. The Russian army has performed poorly, casualties are high. Nonetheless, Putin is more confident now than a year ago when his troops fled Kharkiv and Kherson. 

Of course, his understanding of the war comes from obliging officials who know well the costs of disappointing Stalin’s successor. They may not have noted that in recent days Ukrainian air defenses have been destroying Russian aircraft at a remarkable rate or that later this year the skies will be filled with F-16s. Putin’s buoyancy likely remains high. 

The ground war

Despite systemic self-deception, in army and state, the coming of a Ukrainian offensive must have caused considerable worry from battalion headquarters to the very top. The loss of territory last year couldn’t be hidden, nor could the influx of NATO hardware. 

However, Russian positions near Kherson and Zaporizhzhia gave ground but never broke. Ukraine couldn’t make decisive breakthroughs toward the Sea of Azov and Crimea. Ukrainian efforts to retake the eastern town of Bakhmut also failed. Ukrainian losses are thought to be high – so high that ambitions had to be drawn back. Russian successes are probably due more to minefields, trench networks, and air and artillery support than to improvements in armor and infantry operations.

In recent weeks the Russians have picked up ground south of Bakhmut. Using relentless artillery fire, as they did in World War Two, they’ve been able to take Avdiivka. Russian casualties according to embedded mil-bloggers were high. (A prominent one reportedly killed himself recently.) The army remains in poor shape, relying on spirited morale drawn from the past.

The propaganda war

Putin has successfully convinced his public that the effort to conquer Ukraine is actually a defensive war against foreign invaders. It’s presented as a reprise of the Great Patriotic War against Germany, Romania, Finland, Spain, and Italy who invaded in June 1941. He taps into traditional beliefs of moral strength, unity, and the ability to endure tremendous suffering. The war is commemorated in every park, school, and military display. It lives in family lore too as almost every family lost several loved ones.

The enemies of WW2 and Cold War are once again on the move. They’re arming Ukraine to put Russia back into the pathetic state after the Soviet Union fell, which Putin’s rule has overcome. The nation cannot let that happen again. So goes the propaganda – repeatedly and without rebuttal. Thus far it’s maintaining morale in the army and public. There’s no sign of significant opposition or weakening repressive capacity. 

The ideological benediction can in time be undermined. Foreign propaganda would do well to help the process.

The Kremlin has issued a stream of lies about casualties. However, reports from veterans and rumors at gatherings will create disquiet and doubt. The view here has been that long-range weapons, partisan attacks, and seaborne raids will interdict supplies to Crimea and inflict unstoppable casualties on its beleaguered garrisons, making it a meat grinder with little opportunity for retaliation from the isolated peninsula. 

The public will need to see signs of progress. Taking Bakhmut and Avdiivka may make for bold headlines but few Russians have heard of these towns. The invocation of WW2 may backfire. Two years after the Reich invaded, Stalin had defended Moscow, annihilated a German army at Stalingrad, and blunted the 1943 offensive near Kursk. The march to Berlin was on. Putin can point only to a small town or two and lines that barely move. 

The war is costly to Russia but beneficial to China. Russia’s former subordinate and putative ally is increasing its penetration of the Russian Far East, the trans-Ural region, and former SSRs in Central Asia. Russia is more and more reliant on China, Iran, and N Korea for export revenue, weapons, and technology. The Russian public and state will realize they are becoming beholden to people they deem inferior. A people that eagerly embraces conspiracies might come to believe that China goaded Russia into invading Ukraine to seize more land in the east.

Putin’s greatest boost may have come not from the frontlines or propaganda mills. It may have come from Congress, the GOP majority that is in control of it, if barely, and the unraveling of American society and state. More on this anon.

©2024 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.