America’s uncertain reliability and the Ukraine war 

Brian M Downing 

Vladimir Putin, then a junior KGB enforcer, saw the Soviet Union’s collapse as a geopolitical catastrophe. Most of the world deemed it a blessing, especially Eastern Europe which had endured Moscow’s rule since 1945. Another geopolitical shift may be coming. The view here has for some time been that the US is becoming deeply and irreconcilably divided, the social order and political framework are breaking down, and the US may not be able to maintain commitments to allies, even European ones. 

The coming election could see the return of Donald Trump. He admires Putin, criticizes Ukraine, and dismisses NATO. Even if defeated, he could direct his popular base, party loyalists, and legions of militias to attempt a takeover. This could paralyze Washington and divide the armed forces – more so than any time since Grant and Lee went separate ways. 

Russian hegemony?

A critical concern of course is that Europe will recognize it can’t stand up to Russia without the US. Ukraine will fall and the Baltic States will follow. Putin might think he can demand the Baltics in exchange for peace in our times. Some states may find this amenable, even where Santayana is read. Neither Czechia nor Slovakia would go along, neither would most NATO partners.

Putin’s imperial ambitions breathed new life into NATO. It’s more focused now than when Soviet tanks crushed revolts in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Sweden and Finland have joined and could easily close off Russia’s access to the Baltic Sea. Turkey, mindful of Moscow’s longstanding desire to control access to the Mediterranean, is rethinking triangulating between Russia and the West. It has already denied Russian warships access to the Black Sea. 

Europe’s armed forces are far superior to Putin’s spirited but inept hosts. Incursions into the Baltics might grab some land but relentless guerrilla warfare would follow. Russian aircraft would suffer catastrophic losses from superior fighter pilots and air defenses. Turkey could close off access to the Mediterranean, jeopardizing Russian positions in Libya, Syria, Sudan, and Mali. 

The war goes on

The EU’s gross domestic product is ten times Russia’s. Several countries have formidable defense industries that manufacture air defenses, drones, missile systems, armor vehicles, and fighter jets – most of it greatly superior to anything Russia can produce. Europe can and will continue military aid to Ukraine. The bleeding will go on. 

Ukraine will continue a defense in depth – grudgingly ceding a few kilometers at high cost to the enemy. British intelligence estimates Russia has suffered 355,000 killed and wounded since the war began and in recent weeks has been losing 983 a day. However, more important events are taking place behind the frontlines. 

The aim of Ukraine’s summer offensive was to reach the approaches to the Crimean peninsula and prepare to retake it. Russian defenses have made this unobtainable for now but Crimea is nonetheless becoming central. Ukrainian missiles and drones are hitting supply routes (most critically the Kerch bridge), surface vessels, naval bases, logistical hubs, and air fields. Russians may also face partisan attacks and commando raids along the coast.

Troops garrisoned there are far from the trenches of the steppes but they are subject to unrelenting attacks. They are passive participants in a meat grinder  – unable to see their enemy let alone get the satisfaction of paying back in kind. Morale and discipline will suffer, perhaps as soon as the convoys cross the damaged Kerch bridge.

Next: European and Russian staying power

©2024 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.