Brian M Downing
Concerns of Israeli airstrikes on Iranian nuclear sites are on the rise once again. They come after the US, at Israel’s behest, broke with the JCPOA and imposed sanctions on Iran. In response, Iran has cranked up its centrifuges and enriched its uranium stores, though not yet to weapons-grade levels. American and Israeli outrage could be likened to divorcing a wife and after the split-up, accusing her of being unfaithful.
The strikes
The Israeli air force has been practicing sorties on Iranian targets by flying comparable distances to Greek islands, some of which have Russian air defense systems that are obligingly turned on. This gives valuable data on Iranian air-defense capacities. Scenarios abound of Israeli fighters refueling in Azerbaijan or over Saudi Arabia.
The centrifuge sites are hardened targets. Natanz is deep under rock and concrete, Fordo is burrowed deep into a mountain. Israel could destroy the entrances but they could be cleared and reopened. Inflicting serious damage on the centrifuge banks would require not only US bunker-busting weapons but owing to their immense size, also US bombers, either B-52s or B-2s. Jerusalem is trying to borrow such aircraft.
Israel might have put plans to destroy the two enrichment facilities on hold for now and shifted to attacking bases with missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads and with facilities that design nuclear-weapons. This would entail a protracted campaign of air and ground operations – actually, an escalation of an ongoing campaign.
Last September an explosion rocked an IRGC missile facility near Tehran. The cause is unclear but an Israeli drone or F-35 may have been responsible. (Israeli F-35s have likely been penetrating Iranian airspace, undetected, for two years.) Ground operations over the years have already damaged parts of Natanz, several missile bases, and the IRGC base at Parchin where nuclear weapons were thought to be designed. They can all be rebuilt.
The consequences
Successful or not, strikes on Iran will have consequences. How cautiously they’re weighed is a separate matter.
If bunker-busting weapons or sabotage operations were successful, reliable damage assessment would be difficult. Regardless of damage, Iran would be determined to rebuild and go for nuclear latency or even functional weapons. It might do so with considerable international sympathy and help from China and Russia who would relish another American defeat.
Hisbollah could respond with thousands of missiles on Israeli targets, including most cities. Former Mossad chief Meir Dagan saw this danger as reason to hold back from airstrikes on Iran. Hisbollah, however, will be reluctant to launch a sizable attack for fear of another round of devastating airstrikes across all Lebanon, as in 2006.
Iran could retaliate on Israeli and Jewish targets in the Middle East and elsewhere. In recent years the IRGC has been able to assassinate MEK and Arab separatist personnel in Europe. But Israel’s capacity to respond in kind is formidable and daunting.
Israel may want to undermine ongoing talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran. This would keep the wealthy Sunni princes aligned with Israel against Iran and present the possibility of a larger conflict that would gravely weaken Iran. The princes, however, may resent Israel’s heavy-handed interference in their affairs and pursue rapprochement with Iran all the more.
Russia may be angered by an attack on its strongest ally in the region. Though Russia benefits from trade with Israel, it has more to gain from better ties with the wealthy principalities. An attack on Iran, if resented by Sunni powers, could provide an opening for Moscow.
Israel’s standing with the EU, already slumping, would suffer. The EU is annoyed by the loss of lucrative trade with Iran and by Israel’s all but abandonment of the two-state process. Americans, even Jewish ones, are dismayed by the increasingly authoritarian religious-nationalist bloc and are not eager for another conflict in the Middle East.
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Israel cannot halt Iran’s nuclear program, only slow it for a while. Attacks will strengthen Tehran’s desire for revenge and its alignment with China and Russia against the US. The consequences would be generally adverse for Israel. That is the calculus from here. Israeli security bureaus, steeped in a culture formed by near annihilation in Europe and decades of invincibility in the Middle East, will have their own.
© 2021 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.