Scenarios for the Iraq crisis, part four

Brian M Downing

Sustained fighting short of all-out war

In this scenario the Iraqi state doesn’t collapse, but neither does it expel pro-Iran forces and US military personnel. The US and Saudi Arabia are unable to marginalize Iranian-backed militias and political parties. Iran continues to spar with US and Saudi-backed groups.

Inside Iran
Despite even-handed words from Iran’s foreign minister after the missile strike on US targets in Iraq, Khameini and the IRGC continue to threaten US targets throughout the region. The generals are livid over Soleimani’s death and the ayatollahs are supportive.

This demonstrates continued conflict inside the Iranian state between religious and military leaders on the one hand and the elected government  they watch over on the other. The former have the upper hand over the elected government and may seek to further weaken it and make conflict prevail over diplomacy. Washington put diplomacy with Iran aside three years ago.

The conflict
Iran has boasted of continuing attacks on US and allied sites throughout the region. Iran-backed militias in Iraq are as eager for revenge as anyone in Tehran. And of course the killing of local commanders makes them more likely to act independently. Rocket fire onto US positions is common now.

Iran may continue to attack shipping in the Gulf with small IRGC vessels and possibly up the ante with sea mines. Last year’s sophisticated drone attack on Saudi oil facilities may be repeated. A recent drone strike in south Yemen indicates that Iran has positioned drones there now.

It has been suggested here for some time that Afghanistan may become a theater. The IRGC has long trained Taliban fighters near Zahedan and there are signs of increased Iranian aid to the Taliban, possibly including hand-held surface-to-air missiles.

Iran’s adversaries, the US, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, can keep up the pressure. IDF planes and missiles already routinely hit Iranian troops and proxies in Syria. Thus far, Russia has not used its air defenses to help or sold Syria more sophisticated defenses. The adversaries can increase support to separatist and terrorist groups. Insurgencies in the Kurdish northwest, Arab west, and Baloch southeast may pick up.

American focus on Iran varies depending on the president’s current interest. He called back an airstrike on Iran at the last minute, then a few months later ordered a drone strike on Soleimani. The president’s attention is elsewhere for now but Iranian moves will bring new focus and possibly another misstep.

Expectations
Iran’s adversaries want to continue inflicting pain through sanctions and limited strikes in the hope that the Iranian economy will continue to decline and unrest will paralyze or even topple the government. This is unlikely as the state’s repressive capacity remains formidable. Nonetheless, it is an abiding and governing misconception in parts of the White House.

Russia and China will shore up Tehran’s coffers in the event of fiscal crisis and come to its aid diplomatically and militarily if need be. They are eager for the Iran confrontation to become another divisive issue in an election year. Failure would augur the beginning of American decline in world affairs.

Saudi Arabia’s expectations might not be adequately considered. It hopes to see Iran gravely weakened, perhaps even fragmented like Libya and Yemen. Saudi Arabia would then be the dominant power in the Middle East and its project of building a league of beholden states stretching from the Maghreb to Pakistan will have taken a major step forward.

How this is in the interest of the US or Israel is unclear. Nonetheless, the last three presidents, at least, have been laboring to bring this about. As Kissinger once noted, “Each success only buys an admission ticket to a more difficult problem.” We might acknowledge his experience here.

 © 2020 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.